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SARAH C. HAAN

Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private
Ordering of Public Elections
abstract . Reform of campaign ﬁnance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various
federal agencies, but it is steadily unfolding in a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm program of private ordering. Today, much of what is publicly known about how individual public companies spend money to
inﬂuence federal, state, and local elections—and particularly what is known about corporate
“dark money”—comes from disclosures that conform to privately negotiated contracts.
The primary mechanism for this new transparency is the settlement of the shareholder proposal, in which a shareholder trades its rights under SEC Rule 14a-8—and potentially the rights
of other shareholders—for a privately negotiated social policy commitment by corporate management. Settlements of campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposals are memorialized in detailed private agreements that set the frequency, format, and substance of disclosure reports; are enforced
by private actors; and typically are not available to other shareholders, corporate stakeholders, or
the public. Proposal settlements are producing a body of private disclosure law that increases
corporate transparency to advance First Amendment values and is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. The disclosure standards themselves are a mixed bag: effective at ﬁlling some
gaps in public campaign ﬁnance disclosure law, but inadequate to make corporate electoral
spending transparent in advance of elections.
As a form of private electoral regulation, the proposal settlement mechanism raises issues of
democratic transparency, participation, accountability, and enforcement. This Article challenges
the characterization of proposal settlements as “voluntary” corporate self-regulation, provides a
framework for understanding settlement-related agency costs, and shows how settlement subverts the traditional justiﬁcations for the shareholder proposal itself. Solutions that address the
democratic and corporate governance problems of settlement largely overlap, suggesting a path
forward.
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introduction
Tobacco giant Altria Group, Inc.’s website includes links to reports of the
company’s political expenditures and describes them as “voluntary disclosures.”1 Dominion Resources, Inc., one of the largest utilities in the United
States, states on its website that it is “pleased to provide a voluntary report” of
its political payments and provides a link to a report.2 Both companies, however, publicly disclose their campaign ﬁnance expenditures pursuant to a private
agreement with an investor that speciﬁes the format, frequency, and substance
of the disclosure.3 The disclosure reports are “voluntary” only in the sense that
they are not mandated by public law;4 they are mandated by private contracts
in which the ﬁrms committed to detailed disclosure standards in exchange for
something of value from an investor—withdrawal of a shareholder proposal
brought pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-8.5

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

264

Disclosures & Transparency, ALTRIA, http://www.altria.com/About-Altria/Government
-Affairs/disclosures-transparency/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/FR33-9JPD] (“The
use of company resources for political and public policy activities can be an important issue
for shareholders. As such, Altria makes the following voluntary disclosures regarding these
activities.”).
Political Contributions, DOMINION, http://www.dom.com/corporate/investors/governance
/political-contributions [http://perma.cc/FPF7-8E58].
Documents memorializing the January 2010 agreement between Altria Group, Inc. and the
Office of the New York City Comptroller are on ﬁle with the author. Altria’s current annual
disclosures adhere to the commitments outlined in the 2010 letter. See ALTRIA, supra note 1.
A March 2007 letter from Dominion Resources, Inc. to Trillium Asset Management memorializing their agreement is on ﬁle with the author. See Dominion Resources - Disclosure of Political Contributions (2006-2007), TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com
/shareholder-proposal/political-contributions-8 [http://perma.cc/6U59-XZBV] (providing
the text of the proposal with the notation “Outcome: Successfully Withdrawn”). Dominion’s
current annual disclosures adhere to the commitments outlined in the 2007 letter, and exceed them in some regards. See Political Contributions, supra note 2.
U.S. companies are not required by campaign ﬁnance laws to disclose their campaign ﬁnance expenditures directly to the public, nor are they required by federal securities law to
report those expenditures to shareholders or the market. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104, 30112
(2012) (creating a framework in which campaign ﬁnance information is reported to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which itself communicates the information to the public);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101
GEO. L.J. 923, 925 (2013) (explaining that federal securities regulation currently does not require reporting companies to disclose their political spending to investors, and arguing that
it should); infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text (describing how the most common
categories of corporate campaign ﬁnance expenditures are disclosed to the FEC by thirdparty intermediaries).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016).

shareholder proposal settlements

The shareholder proposal settlement has become increasingly popular as a
tool for negotiating private rules for corporations on matters that are, by long
tradition, subjects of public regulation.6 Corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure
stands at the vanguard of this trend.7 Although reform of campaign ﬁnance
disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, disclosure reform is steadily unfolding in a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm program of private ordering. Today, much of what is publicly known about how large, publicly held companies
spend money to inﬂuence federal, state, and local elections and ballot proposals
comes from disclosures that conform to privately negotiated standards.8 More
6.

7.

8.

Researchers have documented growth in the number of social and environmental shareholder proposals made by investors in U.S. public companies since the late 1990s, as well as
an increase in the number and proportion of social and environmental proposals that have
settled. See Rob Bauer et al., Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals and Does It Matter? An
Analysis of Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 472, 477 tbl.1 (2015)
(showing a small but steady rise in the number of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
proposals “ﬁled” from 1997 to 2009, and a more signiﬁcant increase in the proportion of
CSR proposals that were withdrawn); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for
Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 88-89 (2008) (describing the growth in social
and environmental proposal activism); Kose John & April Klein, Shareholder Proposals and
Corporate Governance 14-15 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Dep’t of Fin. Working Paper Series 1998,
FIN-98-046, 1995), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/ﬁnance/docs/WP/1998/pdf/wpa98046.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L7UU-TU33] (identifying 165 “social change” proposals at S&P 500 ﬁrms
in the year from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992); Key Characteristics of Prominent ShareholderSponsored Proposals on Environmental and Social Topics, 2005-2011, INV. RESP. RES. CTR. INST.
9 (Feb. 2013), http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Ernst-Report
-Feb-20131.pdf [http://perma.cc/G957-YQLS] (“During 2005-2011, the proportion of
shareholder-sponsored resolutions on [environmental and social] topics grew by a third,
from about 30% to 40% of all shareholder proposals going to a vote.”). Compare Randall S.
Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support,
Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 381, 382-83 tbl.4 (2007) (counting
403 social and environmental shareholder proposals that went to a vote at U.S. public companies in the three-year period from 2002 to 2004), with Limor Bernstock & Enver Fitch,
United States 2015: Proxy Season Review—Environmental and Social Issues, INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 3 (Sept. 8, 2015) [hereinafter ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review] (on ﬁle
with author) (counting 209 social and environmental proposals that went to a vote in 2015
alone).
Proxy Preview reported that ninety-nine shareholder proposals on corporate political
activity were submitted in the 2016 proxy season (which began in 2015), making it the
single largest category of social and environmental proposals that year. See Record Number
of Climate and Corporate Political Spending Resolutions Dominate 2016 Shareholder Votes,
PROXY PREVIEW 1 (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.proxypreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/03/proxy_preview_release_record_number_climate_corporate_political_spending_resolu
tions_dominate_2016_shareholder_votes_20160308.pdf [http://perma.cc/VSU9-V3M2].
For example, corporate payments to non-disclosing 501(c) nonproﬁts (a form of indirect
outside spending) are reported exclusively in corporations’ “voluntary” reports. For a primer
on dark money spending in elections, see Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
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than one hundred such agreements exist, most with Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) 500 companies, although the precise number is difficult to determine
due to the secrecy that pervades settlement.9
The phenomenon of the shareholder proposal settlement springs from the
shareholder proposal, a mechanism through which shareholders can put qualifying proposals up for a full shareholder vote. In order to facilitate a shareholder vote on proposed resolutions at the annual shareholder meeting, securities
law requires a company to publish in its own proxy statement any qualifying
resolution submitted by a shareholder. If the company can reach a private deal
with the shareholder to withdraw the proposal, however, then the company can
avoid including the proposal in its proxy materials.
While shareholders may submit proposals on a wide range of topics, recent
years have seen notable growth in social and environmental proposals. Investors submitted more shareholder proposals on social and environmental subjects in 2015 than in any previous year: 474 in total, according to Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS).10 Forty percent of these were withdrawn before
they went to a shareholder vote, suggesting that, in a single year, nearly 200
were negotiated to a private agreement.11 The overall effect of proposal settle-

http://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/dark-money-basics.php [http://perma.cc/5LRN
-78X7]. In Wisconsin, corporations’ direct candidate contributions in state elections also are
subject only to “voluntary” reporting, following the passage of a new campaign ﬁnance law
in 2016. See Daniel Bice, Law Allows Political Parties To Hide Sources of Corporate
Donations, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog
/noquarter/law-allows-political-parties-to-hide-sources-of-corporate-donations-b99647830
z1-364591981.html [http://perma.cc/3CFP-BKWZ].
9. The Center for Political Accountability (CPA), a Washington, D.C. nonproﬁt, has reported
the existence of 141 investor-ﬁrm agreements with major U.S. companies that address
the companies’ political spending and campaign ﬁnance disclosure practices. See Bruce
Freed, Experts Give Votes of Conﬁdence for Corporate Political Disclosure Effort, SPOTLIGHT ON
CPA (Ctr. for Political Accountability, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2015, at 1, http://ﬁles
.politicalaccountability.net/news/cpa-newsletters/September_2015_Newsletter.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9XSP-QE2Y].
10. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3. Two sources for general information about
social and environmental shareholder proposals are the annual proxy season reviews published by ISS and the annual Proxy Preview published by the Sustainable Investments Institute (Si2) and Proxy Impact. However, for reasons discussed more fully infra note 55 and accompanying text, there are good reasons to suspect that these reports undercount social and
environmental shareholder proposals that are settled. Thus, it is likely that the number of
social and environmental shareholder proposals in 2015 exceeded 474.
11. See ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3, 7. Shareholder proposals are generally
withdrawn because the parties have reached a settlement, but there are some circumstances
in which a shareholder might withdraw a proposal for other reasons. See id. at 8 (noting that
“every year proponents drop a few resolutions only after it becomes clear that they are likely
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ments is greater than their annual number suggests. Settlements commit ﬁrms
to long-term practices that can continue years into the future, and the companies targeted for private deal making tend to be the largest S&P 500 companies,
which have vast operations subject to the new rules and signiﬁcant inﬂuence
over their industries.
In addition to campaign ﬁnance and lobbying disclosure, social and environmental proposal settlements have addressed greenhouse gas emissions,12
methane emissions,13 hydraulic fracturing,14 water use and water risk,15 palm
oil sourcing,16 the use of pesticides,17 the use of genetically modiﬁed organisms

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

to lose challenges at the SEC” and identifying ﬁve of 474 social and environmental proposals
in 2015 as having been withdrawn on that basis, all concerning the CEO pay ratio). ISS
separately breaks out “omitted” proposals—those that the SEC has allowed a company to exclude from the proxy in a no-action letter. Id.
See, e.g., Shareholder Advocacy Highlights, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT. 1 (Dec. 31,
2015), http://www.trilliuminvest.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Shareholder-Advocacy
-Highlights-12.31.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/EPG4-WRSY] (“Trillium recently withdrew our
proposal at Hologic following the company’s commitment to set company-wide greenhouse
gas reduction targets in 2016.”).
See, e.g., EOG Resources—Methane Emissions—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/eog-resources-methane-emissions-2016 [http://
perma.cc/TF27-URL7] (providing the text of a 2016 proposal at EOG Resources that was
“[s]uccessfully withdrawn subject to the company’s commitment to disclose its methane
emissions rate, its LDAR program, and to include methane issues in its 2016 proxy materials”).
See, e.g., Letter from Danielle Fugere, President, As You Sow, to Gerald A. Morton, Gen.
Counsel, Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/02/EXECUTED-LTR-As-You-Sow-Carrizo-re-withdrawal.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/9DF6-CE9U] (memorializing a 2016 settlement agreement with Carrizo Oil &
Gas, Inc. addressing fracking disclosure).
See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, WALDEN ASSET MGMT., http://www
.waldenassetmgmt.com/investing-for-Change/shareholder_resolution_history
[http://
perma.cc/WR57-HAHS] (listing 2012 proposals at Qualcomm and Sysco requiring disclosure on “water risk in supply chain” that were “[w]ithdrawn with agreement”).
See, e.g., WhiteWave—Palm Oil Impacts—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/whitewave-palm-oil-impacts-2016
[http://
perma.cc/ZC55-3V8B] (providing the text of a 2016 proposal at The WhiteWave Foods Co.
that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn subject to the company’s commitment to sustainably
and responsibly source palm oil”).
See, e.g., The Hain Celestial Group—Pesticide Disclosure and Policies (2014), TRILLIUM
ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/hain-celestial-group
-pesticide-disclosure-policies-2015 [http://perma.cc/RWE6-8S6A] (providing the text of a
2014 proposal to the Hain Celestial Group that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn following a
commitment from the company to include information on their pesticide use in their next
Corporate Sustainability Report”).
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(GMOs),18 human rights,19 corporate board diversity,20 discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation,21 data privacy and security,22 fair employment and
labor issues,23 fair housing and fair lending laws,24 the use of nanomaterials,25
recycling and waste management,26 the use of antibiotics on livestock,27 and

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.
24.

25.

26.
27.
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See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, supra note 15 (listing a 2002 proposal to Tricon Global Restaurants demanding a report on the impacts of genetically engineered food that was
“[w]ithdrawn with agreement”).
See, e.g., Nordstrom—Human Rights—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/nordstrom-human-rights-2016 [http://perma.cc
/J5LZ-4SGZ] (providing the text of a 2016 proposal at Nordstrom that was “[s]uccessfully
withdrawn following the company’s commitment to disclose the progress it has made to
curtail human rights violations in its supply chain by the end of the second quarter of
2016”).
See, e.g., Shareholder Advocacy Highlights, supra note 12, at 3 (“We are delighted that we were
able to successfully withdraw a proposal at Palo Alto Networks following a commitment to
update its governance documents to encourage board diversity.”).
See, e.g., First Republic Bank—LGBT—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/15462 [http://perma.cc/EB7W-68ZL] (providing
the text of a 2016 proposal at First Republic Bank that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn following the company’s amendment to its [Equal Employment Opportunity] policy to include
sexual orientation and gender identity”).
See, e.g., Priceline Group—Privacy and Data Security (2015), TRILLIUM ASSET
MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/priceline-group-privacy-data
-security-2015 [http://perma.cc/25CZ-RHKA] (providing the text of a 2015 proposal at
Priceline Group that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn after the company committed to update
its Board’s Audit Committee charter and proxy materials to include responsibility regarding
regulatory, legislative, and reputational privacy and data security risks that confront the
company”).
See, e.g., First Republic Bank—LGBT—2016, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, supra note 15 (listing 2001 proposals to Citigroup and
Lehman Brothers requiring steps to “prevent predatory lending” that were “[w]ithdrawn
with agreement”).
See, e.g., Letter from Danielle R. Fugere, President & Gen. Counsel, As You Sow, to
Richard Emmett, Senior Vice President, Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, Dunkin’ Brands
Grp. (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/dunkin-2015
-nanomaterials-withdrawal.pdf [http://perma.cc/PQ4Q-25V8] (memorializing a 2015 settlement agreement with Dunkin’ Brands Group regarding the use of titanium dioxide in
powdered sugar in donuts).
See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, supra note 15 (listing a 2010 proposal at PepsiCo on
“beverage container recovery and recycling” that was “[w]ithdrawn with agreement”).
See, e.g., Letter from Danielle Fugere, President, As You Sow, to Jill Granat, Gen.
Counsel & Corp. Sec’y, Rest. Brands Int’l Inc. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.asyousow.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Restaurant-Brands-As-You-Sow-Withdrawal-Agreement
-Signed-20160309.pdf [http://perma.cc/GY4L-M2ZW] (ﬁnalizing a 2016 settlement
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bee and pollinator welfare.28 Many proposal settlements commit ﬁrms to information gathering, analysis, and public disclosure, producing private information-forcing rules that are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
The aim of this Article is to analyze an emerging practice that deserves
greater recognition from the legal academy and policymakers. It uses the private ordering of corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure as a case study on social
and environmental proposal settlements and assesses the implications of this
form of private ordering for both corporate governance and public elections.29
Above all, settlements of social and environmental shareholder proposals
lack transparency: the process plays out completely behind closed doors, with
no notice to or participation by most shareholders, other corporate stakeholders, or the public. The resulting agreements are not publicly ﬁled and are rarely
available to those other than the parties who negotiated them.
Because shareholder proposals can be negotiated away behind closed doors,
they give both shareholders and managers incentives to act opportunistically,
generating agency costs. Conﬂicts of interest may arise in the settlement process between shareholder proponents and other shareholders; between officers
and the board; and, at institutional investors, between fund managers and
fund beneﬁciaries. The settlement process creates information asymmetries
that beneﬁt shareholder proponents at the expense of other shareholders. Ultimately, proposal settlements undercut the economic and noneconomic justiﬁcations for the shareholder proposal mechanism itself.
Private disclosure law is also fragile. One of the important ﬁndings of this
Article is that companies have often failed to comply with settlement agreements on campaign ﬁnance disclosure. Enforcement of social and environmental proposal settlements suffers from several problems: a shareholder proponent may be unwilling to undertake the costs of monitoring and enforcement
after a deal is struck; federal securities regulation impedes enforcement; and
changes in shareholding or corporate structure can effectively terminate a settlement without notice to the public. The fragility of proposal settlements sugagreement with Restaurant Brands International regarding disclosures about antibiotic use
in the meat supply chain).
28. See, e.g., As You Sow—General Mills Shareholder Resolution Withdrawal, AS YOU
SOW (2015), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/AYS-General-Mills
-Shareholder-Resolution-Withdrawal_20150626.pdf [http://perma.cc/6749-DQU5] (announcing a 2015 settlement agreement with General Mills regarding disclosures about pollinator decline and the protection of pollinators from exposure to pesticides).
29. Campaign ﬁnance disclosure agreements provide an excellent case study on private social
and environmental standard setting because they constitute one of the largest subcategories
of investor activism on social and environmental policy. See ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review,
supra note 6, at 1.
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gests that the overall costs of maintaining a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm program of private
ordering may be greater than shareholder activists like to admit. It also tends
both to reduce the value of the deals and to fuel mistrust between shareholders
and managers.
Of course, the reform of campaign ﬁnance disclosure through private ordering invokes unique concerns that go beyond those raised by garden-variety
social and environmental proposals. Campaign ﬁnance disclosure reform impacts electoral integrity and, ultimately, the legitimacy of our political process.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,30 which insulated corporate independent expenditures from substantive regulation by the state, left disclosure
regulation at the core of the state’s remaining authority to regulate democratic
elections. This Article documents the privatization of disclosure rulemaking, a
shift that further minimizes the state’s role in regulating democracy, empowering corporate managers and a subset of shareholders at the potential expense of
the citizenry.
This Article ﬁnds that, although standard setting through private mechanisms has generated some improvements upon public campaign ﬁnance disclosure law, it has mostly produced disclosure standards that are mutually beneﬁcial to the private actors who participate in the private standard setting. For
example, the emerging trend in privately negotiated campaign ﬁnance disclosure favors year-end reporting of electoral expenditures, months after November elections. The emerging disclosure standards fail to ﬁll important gaps in
public campaign ﬁnance disclosure law and may serve to channel corporate
electoral spending toward state and local elections.
The analysis in this Article is informed by original source material. Proposal
settlements that set campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards come in different
forms—some are exchanges of emails followed by a withdrawal letter, and others are multi-page contracts signed by both parties. Very few are publicly available. Ultimately, forty-two settlement agreements that set corporate campaign
ﬁnance disclosure standards at companies between 2009 and 2015 were obtained and reviewed for this Article. Some public pension fund agreements
were obtained through a request under New York’s Freedom of Information
Law, while others were obtained through direct requests to settling shareholders and to a third party. Often, in exchange for settlement agreements, I promised not to quote the agreements with attribution. Where possible, I reviewed
the terms of the settlement agreements themselves and compared them to the
companies’ subsequent public disclosures.

30.

270

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the proposal settlement
and explains how settlements make private law. Part II analyzes the settlement
of shareholder proposals as an agency problem for public companies and argues that settlement subverts the traditional economic and noneconomic justiﬁcations for the shareholder proposal mechanism. It also explains why settlement may be emerging as a more common resolution of proposals addressing
social and environmental issues than of proposals dealing with corporate governance.
Part III analyzes campaign ﬁnance disclosure settlements as private election
lawmaking and draws some preliminary conclusions about the quality of corporate disclosures that have been produced by this private law regime. This
Part challenges the idea that corporate policies wrought through settlement are
“voluntary” corporate self-regulation. Recognizing the proposal settlement as a
process created and governed by federal securities regulation, Part III considers
how effectively settlement promotes democratic transparency, participation, accountability, and enforcement in the regulation of electoral transparency.
Lastly, Part IV shows that from both a democratic perspective and a corporate governance perspective, proposal settlements must be made more transparent and enforceable. It suggests how this could be accomplished, but ﬁnds
that most securities law reforms would be half-measures. Proposal settlements
will never facilitate broad participation of corporate stakeholders or the public,
suggesting that democratic concerns cannot be fully mitigated. On the capital
markets side, the high cost of ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm private ordering to achieve fragile
policy reforms is inefficient, and the cost is imposed only upon a subset of investors. In light of these considerations, the inadequacy of privatizing corporate
campaign ﬁnance disclosure presents a strong case for public law reform, including an SEC disclosure mandate. Although this Article uses campaign ﬁnance disclosure as a case study, the theoretical and practical implications of its
analysis can be applied to many other areas of the law in which “voluntary”
corporate self-regulation plays an expanding role.
i. the market-based movement to reform corporate
campaign finance disclosure
In a market-based movement, a group of loosely coordinated institutional
investors has waged a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm program to reform corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure, making signiﬁcant use of the shareholder proposal settlement. In the background, federal securities regulation has created the conditions for settlement, has struck the balance of power between the settling
parties, and has regulated the proposal process in ways that affect the substance
of the resulting disclosures. The settlement agreements—detailed disclosure
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standards that are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny—constitute an important body of private law.
A. The Shareholder Proposal
Under state corporate law, a shareholder may bring an appropriate matter
to a full vote of the shareholders at the corporation’s annual meeting.31 Since
1942, federal securities regulation has enhanced this mechanism by requiring a
company to include an eligible shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement,32
which is sent to all of the company’s shareholders in advance of the annual
shareholder meeting.33 This regulation, embodied in SEC Rule 14a-8, shifts the
cost of communicating the proposal from the shareholder proponent to the
company, and formalizes the processes of shareholder voice.34
The academic literature generally divides shareholder proposals into a corporate governance category and a social and environmental category. According
to this approach, corporate governance proposals address the governance of the
ﬁrm, including matters such as proxy access,35 shareholder voting, and poison
pills.36 Social and environmental proposals, in contrast, seek to reform corporate social and environmental policies on a range of topics that involve thirdparty interests, including consumer product safety, environmental impacts, labor and employment issues, and corporate political spending.37 Proposals pri-

31.
32.

33.
34.

35.

36.

37.
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See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2016).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016). A company’s proxy statement provides information on matters
that will be decided by a shareholder vote. See generally id. § 240.14a-3 (outlining information requirements in solicitations to security holders).
Id. § 240.14a-8.
As described in more detail below, the investor must meet certain eligibility requirements to
qualify for inclusion on the proxy statement, and the proposal itself must satisfy standards
set by the SEC. See Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice: Evidence from a Comparison of the United States and United Kingdom, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 739, 763
(2012) (discussing “the growing signiﬁcance of shareholder proposals as a governance control tool”); infra note 177 and accompanying text.
“Proxy access” refers to the right of shareholders in public companies to have their nominees
to the board of directors included in the company’s proxy statement and on its proxy ballots.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insigniﬁcance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV.
1347, 1349-50 (2011).
The term “poison pill” describes a shareholder rights plan adopted as a takeover defense. See
generally THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 541-603 (3d ed. 2013) (providing cases and background on poison pills).
Political spending proposals may have elements of both corporate governance proposals and
social and environmental proposals because they often include board oversight requirements
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marily have focused on informational solutions to social and environmental
problems, demanding that ﬁrms engage in information gathering, analysis,
and public disclosure rather than compelling or prohibiting particular activities.38
Importantly, most shareholder proposals—and virtually all social and environmental proposals—are precatory, which means that they are recommendations and are not binding on management. However, as explained at greater
length in Part II, there is signiﬁcant pressure on management to implement
winning proposals.
Rule 14a-8 allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal based on
several speciﬁed grounds with the approval of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance in what is called a “no-action letter.”39 The rule has permitted
shareholders to bring social and environmental proposals only since the 1970s,
when language allowing the automatic exclusion of proposals “promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes” was ﬁrst revised and then eliminated in favor of the “ordinary business” exclusion.40 Toin addition to public disclosure. Thus, there has been some inconsistency in the categorization of political spending proposals in the academic literature. Most often, however, the
business law and ﬁnance literatures have categorized political spending proposals as “social”
or “social issue” proposals.
38. See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 93-94 (discussing the shift in favor of social and environmental
proposals demanding corporate reporting and disclosure).
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)-(13) (2016) (listing exclusions). Rule 14a-8 requires a company to submit to the SEC its reasons for excluding a shareholder proposal from its
proxy. See id. § 240.14a-8(j). The SEC responds with a no-action letter expressing an
“informal view” about whether the company may properly exclude the proposal. See Div. of
Corp. Fin., Informal Procedures Regarding Shareholder Proposals, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpﬁn/cf-noaction/14a-8
-informal-procedures.htm [http://perma.cc/2LW5-FLDV]. Although no-action letters are
not binding upon the SEC or the parties, companies typically comply with them.
40. Rule 14a-8 was speciﬁcally amended in 1952 to allow companies to exclude a proposal made
“primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social
or similar causes.” General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 Fed.
Reg. 11,431, 11,433 (Dec. 18, 1952) (codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1963)). This language was revised in 1972 to reach any proposal “that action be taken with respect to any
matter, including a general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or similar cause, that
is not signiﬁcantly related to the business of the issuer.” General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178, 23,179 (Oct. 31, 1972) (codiﬁed at 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1973)). In 1976, the SEC eliminated this language altogether in
favor of the “ordinary business” exclusion. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 53,000 (Dec. 3, 1976) (codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1977)). For a history of the SEC’s evolution on social and environmental
proposals, see Fairfax, supra note 6, at 86 nn.179-80. In an important law review article in
1999, Cynthia A. Williams argued that the SEC should mandate disclosure of companies’
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day, the ordinary business exclusion allows a company to exclude a proposal
addressing “a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”41
Through its application of the ordinary business exclusion in no-action letters,
the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance essentially determines which kinds
of social and environmental matters are subject to shareholder oversight. The
SEC has stated that a shareholder proposal “transcend[s]” a company’s ordinary business if it “raise[s] policy issues so signiﬁcant that it would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.”42 In the last few decades, the SEC has increasingly been asked to judge speciﬁc social and environmental reforms as it has
policed companies’ use of the ordinary business exclusion.43
A typical shareholder proposal contains two parts: a resolution, commonly
written in the form of a policy or standard, which shareholders are asked to ap-

social and environmental information, but the SEC has done little to embrace corporate social transparency, and it remains primarily a domain of private ordering. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1197, 1199 (1999).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2016).
42. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28,
1998). The latest battle over the ordinary business exclusion concluded in 2015. In advance
of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s 2014 shareholder meeting, one of its investors had
submitted a proposal demanding board oversight and public reporting relating to WalMart’s sale of ﬁrearms. Wal-Mart sought and obtained a no-action letter from the SEC on
the grounds that the proposal addressed the company’s ordinary business operations, and
the Third Circuit resolved subsequent litigation in Wal-Mart’s favor. See Trinity Wall St. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015); SEC
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14h.htm
[http://perma.cc/4AJ3-932D]; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s
Ordinary Business Exemption: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal (UCLA
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 16-06,
2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2750153
[http://perma.cc
/D8VM-DGQW] (critiquing the Trinity decision and proposing an alternative test in applying the ordinary business exclusion).
43. For example, in 2012, the SEC issued a no-action letter to AT&T, Inc., in which it treated
two proposals received by the company—one addressing electoral expenditures and the other lobbying expenditures—as “substantially duplicative.” AT&T Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
2012 WL 748855 (Mar. 1, 2012). The SEC allowed AT&T, Inc. to exclude a lobbying proposal
from its proxy on that basis. See id.; see also Wellpoint, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL
838391 (Feb. 20, 2013) (treating campaign ﬁnance proposal and lobbying proposal as “substantially duplicative”). In 2013, the SEC recognized that lobbying expenditures and electoral expenditures are different, facilitating a rapid rise in the number of separate lobbying
proposals that have been brought, settled, and voted on. See, e.g., Letter from Ted Yu, Senior
Special Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Thomas S. Moffatt, CVS Caremark Corp.,
2013 WL 178208 (Mar. 15, 2013).

274

shareholder proposal settlements

prove, and an explanatory statement in support of the resolution.44 A nonproﬁt
organization, the Center for Political Accountability (CPA), offers a proposal
template that addresses corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure;45 the template
is widely used.46 The template reduces costs for the shareholder proponent and
helps make policies consistent across companies.47 The CPA has taken a leading role in coordinating shareholder activism on campaign ﬁnance disclosure,
identifying corporate targets, promoting its proposal template directly to institutional investors, and providing information and advice to shareholder proponents to advance shareholder activism on corporate political spending.48 In

44.
45.

46.

47.

48.

Throughout this Article, I adopt the SEC’s convention and use the term “shareholder proposal” to mean both the resolution and the statement in support.
The CPA’s template demands semi-annual reporting of:
[p]olicies and procedures for making, with corporate funds or assets, contributions and expenditures (direct or indirect) to (a) participate or intervene in any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office, or (b) inﬂuence the general public, or any segment thereof, with respect to
an election or referendum”; and “[m]onetary and non-monetary contributions
and expenditures (direct and indirect) used in the manner described [above], including: [t]he identity of the recipient as well as the amount paid to each; and . . .
[t]he title(s) of the person(s) in the Company responsible for decision-making.
CPA 2015 Shareholder Proposal Template, CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY (2015) (on ﬁle with
the author).
In 2014, the Sustainable Investments Institute reported that forty-nine of ﬁfty-two shareholder proposals on electoral spending disclosure that year had followed the CPA template.
See Heidi Welsh, Mid-Year Review: Corporate Political Activity Proposals in the 2014 Proxy Season, SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST. 15 (Aug. 28, 2014), http://si2news.ﬁles.wordpress.com/2014/08
/si2-2014-proxy-season-mid-year-review-corporate-political-activity-excerpt.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/9S3E-SV4B].
The CPA’s annual Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability promotes more
detailed disclosure standards. These include semi-annual reporting of corporate expenditures on a “dedicated political disclosure web page found through search or accessible within
three mouse-clicks from [the] homepage,” archiving of reports “at least for the past ﬁve
years,” and disclosing several categories of information that are subject to mandatory disclosure under campaign ﬁnance laws, including contributions to candidates, parties, and committees, payments to 527 groups such as Super PACs, and direct independent expenditures.
The 2014 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability, CTR. FOR POL.
ACCOUNTABILITY 28 (Sept. 24, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 CPA-Zicklin Index], http://ﬁles
.politicalaccountability.net/2014_CPA-Zicklin_Index_PDF.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9VGG
-4G5D]. The Index also promotes disclosure of “payments made to inﬂuence the outcome of
ballot measures, including recipient names and amounts given.” Id.
As we shall see in Part III, the CPA also takes a leading role in monitoring ﬁrm compliance
with settlement agreements. Shareholder activism on other social and environmental subjects is often coordinated by other nonproﬁt organizations. For example, the Investor
Environmental Health Network coordinates institutional activism on toxic substances,
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this way, the nonproﬁt CPA absorbs many of the costs of activism that would
otherwise be borne by individual shareholders.
The proposal process begins when an investor prepares a formal shareholder proposal for inclusion in a public company’s annual proxy statement. This is
often done simply by customizing the CPA’s template. Although the academic
literature typically describes shareholders “ﬁling” proposals, proposals are not
ﬁled with the SEC or another governmental agency, but instead are delivered to
the ﬁrm’s principal executive office.49 Upon receipt, the company must determine whether the proposal complies with the many procedural requirements of
Rule 14a-8 and, if it does not, must allow the shareholder proponent an opportunity to cure certain defects.50 Thus, from the earliest stages of the process,
corporate management oversees the submission process, identifying excludable
proposals and communicating with shareholders.
Although shareholder proposals have generally promoted progressive social
and environmental policies, this political imbalance has started to change. In
2015, an investor-sponsored proposal at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase
demanded that the companies adopt a policy to “exert maximum inﬂuence over
the political process to control government and further the self-interest of the
corporation.”51 A proposal ﬁled at McDonald’s supported the use of GMOs,52

such as pesticides. See INV. ENVTL. HEALTH NETWORK, http://iehn.org/home.php [http://
perma.cc/WMT3-XQAP].
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2) (2016).
50. For example, a shareholder must include with the proposal a statement that it intends to
continue ownership of its shares through the date of the meeting at which the vote would
occur. See id. § 240.14a-8(b). If a shareholder fails to include this statement, it must remedy
the deﬁciency within fourteen days of notiﬁcation from the company. See id. § 240.14a-8(f).
Failure to remedy this and other procedural deﬁciencies allows the company to exclude the
proposal and treat it as a nullity. Id.
51. The proposals at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase were slightly different and requested
that the companies’ boards of directors adopt several policy principles. For example, the
Goldman Sachs proposal included this principle: “A corporation should maximize shareholder value, regardless of the consequences such conduct may have on natural persons of
any local, state or national jurisdictions.” Letter from Sanford J. Lewis to the Sec. & Exch.
Commission (Jan. 26, 2015), attached as an exhibit to Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, 2014 WL 7406246 (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpﬁn/cf
-noaction/14a-8/2015/johnharrington021315-14a8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4F3C-CK6A];
JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 737682 (Feb.
18, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpﬁn/cf-noaction/14a-8/2015/harringtoninvest
mentsjp021815-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YXJ-BKNU]; ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 12. ISS described these proposals as “ironic.” ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 12. Both proposals were excluded from the companies’ proxy statements as relating to the companies’ “ordinary business.”
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and Apple and Google each received two proposals ﬁled by skeptics of climate
change.53 The emergence of pro-business social and environmental proposals
suggests that, in the future, the proposal process may become a more highly
contested arena for the reform of corporate social and environmental policies.54
B. Study of Proposal Settlements
Settlement of a proposal ensures that the proposal will not ﬁnd its way into
the public record. Withdrawn proposals are not ﬁled with the SEC. There is no
registry or collection of proposals that have been settled, no list of companies
that have settled proposals, and no central repository of settlement agreements.55 The lack of transparency around proposal settlements creates signiﬁcant challenges for their study.56 As one consequence, it is not even possible to

52.
53.
54.

55.

56.

ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 16, at 16. The proposal went to a vote and received
4.8% shareholder support. Id.
Id. at 21.
See Heidi Welsh & Michael Passoff, Proxy Preview 2016, PROXY PREVIEW 59-60 (Feb.
17, 2016), http://www.proxypreview.org/download-proxy-preview-2016 [http://perma.cc
/5EAV-XF2Y] (identifying ten proposals from “politically conservative groups” in the 2016
proxy season).
The CPA maintains some settlement-related documents for settlements that utilized its proposal template. Separately, the Society of Corporate Secretaries maintains a shareholder
proposal database for its members, but it does not contain a comprehensive collection of
proposals received by U.S. public companies. A number of organizations, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and the Sustainable Investments Institute, publish proxy
season reports that tally withdrawn shareholder proposals. Proxy season reviews provide
only rough estimates of the number of settlements in a given year. This is because, if a proposal is not published in the proxy statement, third-party organizations learn of it only if the
shareholder proponent or the target company tells them about it, or if it is referenced in a
no-action letter request to the SEC. For this reason, proxy season reports of withdrawn
shareholder proposals may undercount the true number of withdrawn proposals.
In a 2016 blog post, a retail investor and proponent of shareholder proposals, James
McRitchie, explained this concisely:
[D]uring the past year I reached agreements with several companies to withdraw
proxy access proposals, based on agreements reached with companies. In most
cases, few would ever know because the companies usually put out a press release
announcing their recently adopted bylaws and credit is never given to a shareholder proposal for prompting such action.
James McRitchie, Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals?, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 21,
2016), http://www.corpgov.net/2016/01/who-withdraws-shareholder-proposals [http://
perma.cc/QN9E-8J9K].
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state with certainty the number of social and environmental shareholder proposals that were submitted in any particular year.57
In background interviews for this Article,58 representatives of investor activists described their execution of detailed written agreements with public
companies to settle shareholder proposals on campaign ﬁnance disclosure. I set
out to collect these agreements and, through requests to settlement participants
and third parties (and one request to a particular investor under New York’s
Freedom of Information Law), gathered primary documents59 that pertained to
approximately 120 companies and dated as far back as 2005.60 A number of settlement participants declined to provide agreements and expressed the view
that written transparency agreements between a shareholder and a public company are private documents. Ultimately, I documented forty-two settlement
agreements made between 2009 and 2015. Only agreements that memorialized
a speciﬁc disclosure commitment in exchange for the withdrawal of a shareholder proposal were included in this set.61
These agreements do not constitute a representative sampling of agreements from that period; they are simply all of the agreements I was able to ob-

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.
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For example, ISS put the total number of shareholder proposals submitted for shareholder
meetings held in 2015 at 474. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3. Proxy Preview
counted 433 social and environmental proposals submitted as of February 17, 2015. See Heidi
Welsh & Michael Passoff, Proxy Preview 2015, PROXY PREVIEW 8 (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www
.proxypreview.org/download-proxy-preview-2015 [http://perma.cc/76TU-CFYZ].
Interviews of representatives of institutional investors, public companies, and third-party
organizations were conducted between August and October of 2015, subject to agreement
that the interviewees’ statements were not for attribution.
Most documents were obtained from the CPA, which maintains a partial archive of proposal
settlement documents; other documents were obtained from institutional investors and the
internet. These included press releases issued by deal participants, proxy statements and requests for no-action letters on SEC.gov, proposals and proposal responses, negotiation documents, draft policies, and agreements.
Agreements and related materials that were voluntarily contributed by deal participants and
third parties were obtained for research purposes only and are not quoted for attribution
herein.
The reduction of documents relating to approximately 120 companies to a set of forty-two
settlement agreements should not be understood to mean that only forty-two settlements
occurred from 2009 to 2015. Evidence from the documents, the public record, and background interviews suggest that many more proposal settlements were reached during this
time. However, I was able to obtain only incomplete documentation of these other settlements. For an example of a contract between an investor and a company that settled a shareholder proposal by setting campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards, see Letter from Evan
S. Jacobson, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Ronald O. Mueller, at Ex. A
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpﬁn/cf-noaction/14a-8/2014/asyousow03
0514-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/KSF5-CMGC].
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tain. In order to obtain agreements, I often promised not to attribute speciﬁc
language or details from the agreements to particular companies and investors.
I found that settlement participants hesitated to share settlement agreements,
even for academic research purposes, without such a promise; some investors
declined to make agreements and related documents available for my research
even with such a promise.
The forty-two agreements set campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards at forty-one public companies62 across a range of sectors and industries.63 Four of
the forty-two agreements were memorialized in one document with signature
lines for each party. Many other agreements took the form of a memorandum
of understanding or a letter on the company’s letterhead summarizing the deal,
accompanied by a withdrawal letter from the investor, also sometimes summarizing the deal.64 The documents revealed that investors and companies haggled over minute details of disclosure policies; in some cases, there was evidence of signiﬁcant back-and-forth negotiation.65 Together, the forty-two
agreements constitute a body of private disclosure law that forces information
about corporate electoral spending into the public domain.
C. Standard Setting Through Private Settlement
Rule 14a-8 does not address the withdrawal of proposals or regulate settlements.66 Nonetheless, settlement of proposals has become a common practice.
62.
63.

64.
65.

66.

In the case of one company, two agreements with two different investors, several years apart,
were obtained.
Agreements involved eight companies in the consumer staples sector; six in the consumer
discretionary sector; ﬁve each in the materials and ﬁnancials sectors; four each in the energy
and health care sectors; three in the technology sector; and two each in the utilities, industrials, and communications sectors.
In some cases, the parties memorialized their deals through email correspondence, and also
used email to notify withdrawal.
For example, emails related to a 2010 agreement between an S&P 500 company and a public
pension fund reveal that the company initially sought to disclose payments to trade associations “in which it pays dues or makes other payments in excess of $100,000 per year,” and
that the pension fund successfully negotiated this payment threshold down to $50,000.
Email exchanges between [company] and [investor] (Mar. 21-23, 2010) (on ﬁle with the author).
The SEC has amended Rule 14a-8 numerous times since 1942 without addressing settlement. It is, however, aware of the practice. In 1982, in a proposed rulemaking, the SEC
acknowledged that proposals were sometimes “withdrawn after consultation between the
proponent and the issuer’s management.” See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 47 Fed. Reg.
47,420 (proposed Oct. 26, 1982); see also Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals,
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Settlement negotiations take place during the window of time before the proxy
statement is published, typically over several months, through correspondence
and phone conferences in which the shareholder proponent and the target ﬁrm
haggle over details of a ﬁrm policy change. Participation is generally limited to
representatives of the investor and representatives of the ﬁrm. In a few cases,
the nonproﬁt CPA has participated directly in negotiations that led to a campaign ﬁnance disclosure settlement between an investor and a ﬁrm. The tenor
of the negotiations is generally not antagonistic, and the parties are not completely at arms-length. A company’s shareholders and managers are part of the
same corporate enterprise and, in theory and often in practice, are oriented toward the same basic goal of maximizing ﬁrm value.
If the parties reach an agreement to settle the proposal, it is memorialized
in writing, and may be as formal as a contract signed by both parties or as informal as an exchange of emails. Campaign ﬁnance disclosure is a complicated
subject and the settlements reviewed for this Article were lengthy and detailed,
often borrowing deﬁned terms from federal campaign ﬁnance law or the Internal Revenue Code. The typical settlement of a political spending proposal requires the company to make annual or semiannual disclosures of at least some
of its election-related expenditures on its public website.67
Most shareholder proposals on political spending have been submitted by
institutional investors.68 Socially responsible investment (SRI) funds,69 fol-

62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,702 (proposed Sept. 26, 1997) (“We understand that in some instances management has made concessions to shareholders in return for the withdrawal of a
proposal.”).
67. For an example of a company’s public website disclosures, see Political Activities
Disclosure, CONAGRA FOODS, http://www.conagrafoods.com/investor-relations/corporate
-governance/political-activity-disclosure [http://perma.cc/XW3Y-HEXU], which displays
ConAgra Foods, Inc.’s public webpage for political spending disclosures. ConAgra’s disclosure commitment was made in a 2015 proposal settlement with a City of Philadelphia pension fund. ConAgra’s disclosure webpage provides information about its contributions to
state and federal candidates and political committees, its independent expenditures, its
payments “to participate in State ballot initiatives,” and the activities of its Separate Segregated Fund, the ConAgra Foods Good Government Association, which is a federal PAC
funded by its employees. Id.
68. Institutional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, banks, insurance companies,
and hedge funds and are distinguishable from retail, mom-and-pop investors. See generally
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 79 (1987).
69. SRI funds seek to advance socially and environmentally beneﬁcial outcomes through their
investment activities, most commonly by selecting an investment portfolio with the use of
“ethical or ‘values-based’” metrics. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”:
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 82 (2010).
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lowed by public pension funds, are among the most active investors submitting
such proposals.70 Unions have submitted proposals on campaign ﬁnance disclosure roughly half as often as public pension funds.71 An analysis of shareholder proposals on corporate political activity submitted between 2007 and
2013 found that the most active institutional investors were the New York City
Pension Funds (ﬁfty-two proposals), the New York State Common Retirement
Fund (forty-four proposals), Trillium Asset Management (twenty-nine proposals), Walden Asset Management (twenty-three proposals), Northstar Asset
Management (twenty proposals), and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Pension Plan (nineteen proposals).72
All of these funds essentially negotiate corporate disclosure policies on behalf of
the funds’ beneﬁciaries.73
Negotiated standards have required disclosure of information such as a
company’s contributions to support or oppose candidates in state elections;74
its payments in connection with state and local ballot initiatives; and its direct
and indirect independent expenditures in both federal and state elections, including payments to 501(c) nonproﬁt organizations, which would not otherwise be disclosed under public law requirements.75 Some agreements have em70.

71.
72.
73.

74.

75.

Geeyoung Min & Hye Young You, Political Origins of Shareholder Activism: Corporate
Political Spending and Shareholder Proposals 15 tbl.1 (Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
15, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2601181 [http://perma.cc
/DH4P-FGJ5] (noting that between 2007 and 2013, private investment funds sponsored 164
shareholder proposals on corporate political activity, followed by public pension funds with
129 shareholder proposals on the subject).
Id.
Id. app. B, tbl.6 (providing data in a chart entitled “Top Five Shareholders in Terms of
Number of Proposal[s] Submitted”).
The layer of intermediation between fund investors and fund managers, and the ﬁduciary
obligations of fund advisers, introduce agency considerations to proposal settlements that
are addressed in Part II.
Election law distinguishes between “contributions” and “independent expenditures,” and
private campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards have adopted the distinction. In broad terms,
a “contribution” is a donation to a candidate or party committee, while an “independent expenditure” is a payment for a political communication that has not been coordinated with a
candidate or party committee. Under federal law, corporations are prohibited from making
contributions in federal elections, 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012), but may make direct and indirect
independent expenditures. In practice, businesses very rarely make direct independent expenditures. Businesses mainly engage in election-related spending through indirect independent expenditures, primarily by making donations to Super PACs and 501(c) nonproﬁt
organizations. See Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending and Disclosure in
Privately-Held Business Entities in 2012 and Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1158-60 (2014).
As described more fully in Section III.C, the agreements typically commit companies to disclose limited information about payments to 501(c) nonproﬁts. Under the agreements,
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ployed reporting thresholds; for example, one company agreed to report only
“a cumulative total for all contributions and expenditures related to state or local-level recipients . . . if such amount equals or exceeds $100.”76
The agreements have included speciﬁc provisions addressing, among other
things, when the ﬁrst disclosure report will be posted, how frequently disclosures will be updated, whether the party affiliations of recipients will be disclosed, the use of hyperlinks to federal and state agency websites, the posting of
the company’s political spending and disclosure policies on its website, disclosure of the company’s “rationale and strategy” for engaging in the political process,77 disclosure of “[t]he basic decision making process” for expenditure decisions,78 and the identiﬁcation of company employees with decisional authority
over political spending.79
Agreements have also committed ﬁrms to implement corporate governance
practices that relate to political spending and disclosure, such as board oversight of political spending80 and changes to the company’s Code of Conduct.81

76.

77.
78.
79.

80.
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many companies report only payments to 501(c) nonproﬁts that are deemed non-deductible
under section 162(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, as reported to the companies by the
nonproﬁts themselves, and many companies further limit their disclosures by employing a
high-dollar reporting threshold. 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1) (2012); see infra Section III.C.
Letter from [company] to [investor] 1 (Jan. 19, 2011) (on ﬁle with author). Reporting
thresholds for candidate contributions vary state by state and many are lower than $100; the
parties apparently sought to use this provision to standardize the company’s reporting obligations across states and to impose a higher threshold than some states employ.
Letter from [company] to [investor] (Jan. 20, 2012) (on ﬁle with author).
Letter from [company] to [investor] (Jan. 15, 2010) (on ﬁle with author).
See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Mar. 27, 2009) (on ﬁle with author) (memorializing an agreement to identify publicly company employees with decisional authority
over corporate political contributions). Investor activists who use the term “political spending” to describe the subject of their activism generally exclude lobbying disclosure and oversight, and the CPA’s advocacy efforts have not extended to lobbying disclosure. Some campaign ﬁnance disclosure settlement agreements have addressed lobbying disclosure,
however.
See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Mar. 22, 2013) (on ﬁle with author) (memorializing the company’s commitment to “revise our Governance Committee Charter to reference that the Governance Committee [of the Board of Directors] exercises oversight over
political activities, including political fundraising and contributions”). The CPA considers
board oversight essential to its work on corporate political spending and promotes board
oversight through its proposal template, its CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political
Disclosure and Accountability, and its advocacy work. See The 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index of
Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability, CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (Oct.
8, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index], http://ﬁles.politicalaccountability.net/index
/CPA-Zicklin_Index_Final_with_links.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UF7-VT4Q].
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Some agreements have committed ﬁrm management to internal analyses of the
company’s political spending without a disclosure element; these agreements
have sometimes speciﬁed that management will have future, private discussions about ﬁndings or practices with the shareholder proponent.82
In exchange for the company’s written commitment to speciﬁc disclosure
practices, the investor formally withdraws the shareholder proposal.83 The
agreement may state that the company’s commitment is expressly “conditioned
on” or “in consideration for” the withdrawal. The investor may agree to more
than the simple withdrawal of the proposal; for example, one agreement speciﬁed that “[Investor] may make a public statement regarding [Company’s]
adoption of the policy, citing the respectful and constructive dialog that led to
this resolution. [Investor] will give [Company] an opportunity to review its
public statement before publication.”84
A shareholder’s withdrawal of a proposal means that other shareholders
and the public will likely never see it. A withdrawn proposal is not published in
the company’s proxy statement nor submitted for a shareholder vote, and there
will be no trace of it on EDGAR, the SEC’s database of public company ﬁlings.85 Settlement agreements also typically remain private. In only two identi-

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Dec. 22, 2010) (on ﬁle with author) (memorializing an agreement to amend the company’s Code of Conduct to require senior management approval of political spending).
See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Nov. 3, 2009) (“We would also envision, and
welcome, periodic meetings with you throughout each year in order for us to update each
other on developments in the area of political contributions and related activities.”).
It is possible that shareholders could agree to other things, or additional things, to obtain a
company’s commitment to disclosure. For example, an institutional investor could agree
both to withdraw a shareholder proposal and to support management’s position in a shareholder vote on another subject. However, my research turned up no evidence of additional
shareholder commitments beyond withdrawing a proposal. See infra Part II on conﬂicts of
interest and opportunism.
This 2009 agreement was provided to the author with use restrictions and is on ﬁle with the
author. Another of the forty-two agreements reviewed for this analysis speciﬁed that settlement-related communication between the investor and the company would remain conﬁdential. This conﬁdentiality provision was likely designed to address Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD), which prohibits a company from selectively disclosing material nonpublic
information but exempts “person[s] who expressly agree[] to maintain the disclosed information in conﬁdence.” General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2016); see also Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private
Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 205-14 (2009) (exploring the role of Reg. FD
in private negotiations between activist investors and corporate management).
Some investors, like Trillium Asset Management, have published withdrawn shareholder
proposals on their websites. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://
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ﬁed instances has a party to a deal posted a campaign ﬁnance proposal settlement agreement on the internet.86 In rare cases, copies of private agreements
between investors and ﬁrms can be uncovered on the SEC’s website, as exhibits
to withdrawn requests for no-action letters.87 Because the agreement documents are private, the terms of the agreement—and indeed the agreement’s
very existence—may not be known to the company’s other shareholders, to
other corporate stakeholders, or to the public. Some investors, however, have a
practice of issuing a press release or posting information about a settlement on
the internet. In such cases, it is common for the investor to describe the settlement only in broad terms and to characterize the company’s commitment as a
voluntary one.88
Settlement agreements on corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure have become commonplace at large, publicly held U.S. companies. The CPA has reported the existence of 141 agreements that set political spending and campaign

www.trilliuminvest.com/approach-to-sri/shareholder-proposals [http://perma.cc/6KMG
-8KWC].
86. See Letter from J. Stephen Gilbert, Senior Vice President & Sec’y, Valero Energy, to Patrick
Doherty, Office of the State Comptroller of N.Y., Div. of Corp. Governance (Jan. 6,
2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb15/valero_agreement_political_disclos
ure.pdf [http://perma.cc/EX6K-U8GD] (proposal settlement agreement between Valero
Energy and the NYSCRF); The Dow Chemical Company Shareholder Resolution Withdrawal
with As You Sow, AS YOU SOW (2014), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2014
/03/dow2014gmos_withdrawal.pdf [http://perma.cc/P398-BG2N] (proposal settlement
agreement between The Dow Chemical Co., signed by Amy E. Wilson, Assistant Corporate
Secretary and Managing Counsel on February 28, 2014, and As You Sow, signed by Danielle
R. Fugere, President and General Counsel on March 3, 2014).
87. For example, a March 9, 2015 agreement between the AFSCME Employees Pension Plan and
Celgene Corp. can be found as an exhibit to a letter submitted by Celgene Corp. to the SEC
to withdraw its request for a no-action letter. The agreement required Celgene Corp. to “disclose . . . all payments (dues and any other contributions) used for lobbying by trade associations (as reported to Celgene by the trade association as the non-deductible portion of
those payments) for any U.S.-based trade association to which Celgene contributes $50,000
or more annually, beginning with calendar year 2014.” Letter from Richard H. Bagger, Senior Vice President, Celgene Corp., to Charles Jurgonis, Plan Sec’y, AFSCME Emps.
Pension Plan (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpﬁn/cf-noaction/14a-8/2015
/afscmeemployees031015-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/SYT3-MKKA].
88. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli: Five Fortune
500 Companies Reach Agreements on Corporate Political Spending (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/mar16/032316b.htm
[http://perma.cc/BMF9
-Y7VX] (quoting New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, who stated that
“[t]hese companies should be commended for agreeing to voluntarily disclose their political
expenditures”).
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ﬁnance disclosure practices at a major U.S. company.89 ISS reported that at
least eleven proposals on political spending disclosure were withdrawn at U.S.
companies in 2014.90 That year was the most successful year yet for political
spending proposals that reached a shareholder vote: proposals at H&R Block,
Dean Foods, and Smith & Wesson received majority shareholder support in
2014.91 Perhaps in reaction to this success, in 2015, twenty public companies
were reported to settle proposals on campaign ﬁnance disclosure.92 Thus, in
the two years from 2014 to 2015, at least thirty-one proposal settlements set
campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards at U.S. public companies.93
A growing academic literature, primarily in the area of environmental law,
has revealed how private governance mechanisms regulate corporate activity.94

89.

90.

91.
92.

93.

94.

See Freed, supra note 9; see also Bruce F. Freed & Charles E.M. Kolb, Companies that
Favor Political Disclosure, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/bruce-f-freed-and-charles-em-kolb-us-companies-shine-sunlight-on-dark
-money/2014/12/29/f46da050-8d25-11e4-9e8d-0c687bc18da4_story.html [http://perma.cc
/E2ZE-V4GM] (“129 U.S. companies—including more than half of the S&P 100 Index—
have adopted political spending disclosure policies as a result of agreements with shareholders.”).
See Limor Bernstock et al., 2014 Proxy Season Review: Environmental and Social Issues, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 42 (Nov. 5, 2014) (on ﬁle with author) (identifying ten
companies with withdrawn proposals in 2014); Welsh, supra note 46, at 15-16 (identifying
ten companies that reached campaign ﬁnance disclosure deals that led to the withdrawal of
shareholder proposals in 2014). In addition, in 2014, Dow Chemical reached a campaign ﬁnance disclosure agreement with a group of investors to settle a shareholder proposal that
had asked the company to completely refrain from political spending. See Bernstock et al.,
supra, at 44; As You Sow, supra note 86.
See Bernstock et al., supra note 90, at 5, 11. In addition, lobbying disclosure proposals won
majority shareholder support in votes at Valero and Lorillard in 2014. Id.
In an appendix, ISS identiﬁed sixteen companies as having withdrawn proposals on political
spending disclosure in 2015: Allscripts Healthcare, Cerner, Delta Airlines, Eastman Chemical, EOG Resources, FMC Corp., Frontier Commission, Intuit, Kansas City South, McGraw
Hill Financial, MeadWestvaco, Public Service Entertainment, Starwood Hotels, Thermo
Fisher, U.S. Steel, Wyndham Worldwide. Bernstock & Fitch, supra note 6, app. I, at 36-37.
Other sources suggest proposal settlements occurred in 2015 at Cardinal Health, Cisco Systems, ConAgra, Symantec, and Valero Energy.
The New York State Common Retirement Fund has reported proposal settlements on political spending disclosure with twenty-six companies since 2011. See Press Release, Office of
the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli: Five Major Companies Adopt Pension Fund’s Call for
Transparency on Political Contributions (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press
/releases/feb15/020415.htm [http://perma.cc/4CLM-VQDC]. Trillium Asset Management
has reported twenty-four such settlements since 2006. See Shareholder Proposals, supra note
85.
See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2015); Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Pri-
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Michael P. Vandenbergh has described a “shadow law of second-order agreements” between private actors—contracts between nongovernmental entities
that are created in response to the existence or absence of agency regulation—
and has argued that such agreements comprise part of the regulatory regime
itself.95 Private agreements between investors and ﬁrms that establish public
disclosure standards are an example of such a regulatory regime. Campaign ﬁnance disclosure settlements exemplify how individual ﬁrm commitments to
enact a standardized set of transparency rules constitute a program of private
law.
ii. agency problems in proposal settlements
Proposal settlements impose potential agency costs on target ﬁrms. This
Part offers a framework for thinking about the costs to the ﬁrm of setting social
and environmental policies through proposal settlements, and it shows how
proposal settlements undercut the traditional justiﬁcations for the shareholder
proposal mechanism. Because ﬁrms set social and environmental policies
differently from the way that they establish rules of governance, social and environmental settlements and the policies they produce are signiﬁcantly less
transparent to other corporate stakeholders than governance settlements are.
This difference may explain why social and environmental settlements have
begun to outpace governance settlements. The difference in transparency
makes social and environmental settlements more vulnerable to shareholder
and manager opportunism and may incentivize both sides to settle for social
and environmental policies that are minimally socially beneﬁcial and/or minimally value increasing. It also means that information about governance reforms is impounded swiftly into stock prices, while information about social
and environmental policy reforms is not.

vate Environmental Governance, in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Lee Paddock & Robert Glicksman eds., forthcoming 2016), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2645953 [http://perma.cc/P5BD-BGNL]; see
also David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003) (sketching out
models of private conﬂict and resolution); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000) (observing that “private participation in governance”
has been “barely noticed by the public, acknowledged by politicians, or scrutinized by scholars”).
95. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 203034 (2005).
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A. The Theory of the Shareholder Proposal
In a popular theory of the ﬁrm, the shareholders’ role as residual claimants
justiﬁes the ﬁrm’s focus on shareholder value maximization. Because shareholders are entitled to the residuum, they are uniquely incentivized to maximize the value of the ﬁrm for all claimants.96 Moreover, because shareholders
hold diversiﬁed portfolios, they are more tolerant of risk at the ﬁrm level than a
particular ﬁrm’s management.97 Both of these factors justify shareholder monitoring of ﬁrm performance and, in appropriate circumstances, shareholder
course-correction through electing directors and voting on shareholder proposals.98 The shareholder proposal mechanism is thus a key tool for shareholders to inﬂuence the ﬁrm.99
Rule 14a-8 facilitates the shareholder’s use of this tool by shifting some of
the cost of the proposal onto the ﬁrm itself.100 Because the beneﬁt of shareholder inﬂuence is enjoyed by the whole ﬁrm, the theory goes, it makes sense
to spread the cost of shareholder proposals to the whole ﬁrm. This assumes
that at least some shareholders make value-increasing proposals that are adopted by management, and that the net beneﬁt to the ﬁrm of all proposal activity—including proposals that fail—exceeds the aggregate costs imposed by Rule
14a-8. Not surprisingly, academic treatment of Rule 14a-8 has focused on
whether the rule strikes the right balance between facilitating value-increasing
shareholder activism and discouraging the waste of corporate resources on
shareholder speech that is not cost-justiﬁed.

96.

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
RATE LAW 67-68 (1991).

& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-

97.

See id. at 29-30.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 627 (2006) (“[S]hareholder voting is properly understood not as an integral aspect of
the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort
to be used sparingly, at best.”); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting,
62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130 (2009) (arguing that corporate law should treat voting “as a
means of error correction for decisions”).
99. See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 61 (arguing that the shareholder proposal process “represents a
critical component of shareholder activism”); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism:
The Business Case for Monitoring Nonﬁnancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 658 (2016) (describing
the shareholder proposal as one of “shareholders’ primary tools to effect corporate change”).
100. See, e.g., Thomas & Cotter, supra note 6 (describing shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8
as “a tax on all shareholders to facilitate the voice of all shareholder proposals’ proponents”).
The costs that are shifted from the shareholder proponent to the ﬁrm are the costs of publishing the proposal and distributing it to all of the company’s shareholders.
98.
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Although the shareholder proposal mechanism has generated a large volume of academic commentary over the years,101 the settlement of proposals has
attracted little academic attention.102 Evidence suggests that the practice was

101.

The academic literature on shareholder proposals divides into three categories. The early
legal literature, which developed through the 1980s, was largely theoretical, focusing primarily on the purpose of the proposal mechanism in the theory of the ﬁrm. See, e.g., George
W. Dent, Jr., Response, Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose: A Reply to Professor Ryan, 23
GA. L. REV. 815 (1989); George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure,
30 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC
Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporation Gadﬂy, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1952); Timothy L.
Feagans, SEC Rule 14a-8: New Restrictions on Corporate Democracy?, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 225
(1984); Henry G. Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 481 (1972); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988); Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of
the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1977); Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1984).
A second category of legal literature has used empirical data about shareholder proposals to measure and assess their inﬂuence on ﬁrm valuation and management decision
making. See, e.g., Buchanan et al., supra note 34; Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E.
Skroback, Environmental Activism and the Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465 (1997); Alan R.
Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L.
REV. 879 (1994); Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Inﬂuence, 66
FLA. L. REV. 2179 (2014) (reviewing empirical trends in shareholder proposals). Finally, a
number of studies in the ﬁnance literature have investigated shareholder proposals, typically
ignoring but sometimes including social and environmental proposals. See, e.g., Buchanan et
al., supra note 34 (detailing an empirical study of proposals that went to a vote at U.S. and
U.K. companies from 2000 to 2006); Cuñat et al., The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate
Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943 (2012) (detailing an empirical study of almost four thousand corporate governance proposals from 1997 to 2007); Ertimur et al.,
Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J.
CORP. FIN. 53 (2010) (detailing an empirical study of 620 majority-vote shareholder proposals at U.S. companies between 1997 and 2004); Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals, 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993) (detailing an empirical study of 266
corporate governance proposals from the 1990 proxy season); Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh
P. Rao, Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?, 73 J. BUS.
177 (2000) (detailing an empirical study of corporate governance proposals sponsored by
public pension funds from 1988 to 1994, excluding withdrawn proposals); Luc Renneboog
& Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN.
167 (2011). These studies have generally drawn conclusions about proposal activity and its
inﬂuence on corporate management by studying only proposals that were published in the
proxy statement and/or went to a vote.
102. A few works of legal scholarship have acknowledged the practice of proposal settlement, or
something similar. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 828 (1992) (“[M]any companies have adopted
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rare until recently, but settlements occurred at least as far back as the 1970s.103
The most signiﬁcant academic treatment of proposal settlements was authored
by Roberta Romano in 2001 and focused on what she called “nonproxy activism” concerning traditional matters of corporate governance.104 Romano did
not address social and environmental settlements, which were not then occurring in the signiﬁcant numbers of today. The scope of what she considered
“nonproxy activism” went well beyond settlements and included, for example,
a fund’s announcement that a company was on its target list.105 The practice in
which an investor trades its rights under Rule 14a-8—as well as the rights of
other shareholders to vote for the proposal or to engage management through
competing or similar proposals—in exchange for social policy reform is an innovation in shareholder activism. It reﬂects formalized steps that are determined by federal securities law and that lead to the adoption of a written
agreement outlining both parties’ obligations. On this basis, it should be distinguished from informal, nonproxy activism.
In theory, if a shareholder proposal were self-evidently value increasing and
cost justiﬁed, management would simply adopt it. There would be no need for
the publication of the proposal in the proxy and a vote of the shareholders at
the annual meeting. The idea that management will at least sometimes immeproposals voluntarily, to avoid a vote that they might lose.”); Fairfax, supra note 6, at 90
(withdrawal of a proposal “signals that corporate managers and shareholders have reached
consensus regarding the best method to address issues raised by a particular proposal”);
Palmiter, supra note 101, at 884 n.19 (referencing investors’ use of Rule 14a-8 “to reach negotiated agreements with management without formally submitting proposals”); Yockey, supra note 84, at 176 (noting that around the time that institutional investors make informal
overtures to a target company, they “will often submit a formal shareholder proposal on the
issues they seek to address during the jawboning process”).
103. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 101, at 647 (identifying twenty-seven settled social and
environmental proposals in the 1975-76 proxy season).
104. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 180-81, 209-19 (2001) (discussing the
stock price effects of various forms of “nonproxy activism” regarding traditional governance
issues). A small number of articles in the ﬁnance literature have analyzed withdrawn shareholder proposals. See Bauer et al., supra note 6 (studying withdrawn proposals from 1997 to
2009); N.K. Chidambaran & Tracie Woidtke, The Role of Negotiations in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Withdrawn Shareholder-Initiated Proposals 1-2 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law
& Bus., Working Paper #CLB-99-012, 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract
_id=209808 [http://perma.cc/MG7T-MJD2] (studying withdrawn shareholder proposals
from 1989 to 1995); see also Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors:
Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 241 (1996) (studying corporate governance activism at
ﬁfty-one ﬁrms targeted by CalPERS from 1987 to 1993, which included twenty-six cases
where the company “either adopted the resolution or settled the ﬁrst year targeted”).
105. Romano, supra note 104.
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diately recognize and adopt a value-increasing proposal suggests that “informal” shareholder engagement, in which a shareholder communicates directly
with management outside formal channels of governance, can be superior to
“formal” shareholder engagement, which imposes greater costs on the ﬁrm. On
this basis, informal engagement should be valued by investors and encouraged
by rules.
However, the existence of the shareholder proposal mechanism suggests
that informal engagement sometimes fails—that management may occasionally
decline to adopt a value-increasing and cost-justiﬁed proposal. Corporate managers might reject a good proposal because they have poor business judgment,
in which case shareholders should consider replacing them. Short of replacing
the board, the shareholder proposal mechanism gives a shareholder the power
to suggest course-correction to the board in a public forum, and it gives the
body of shareholders the power to ratify that suggestion with a vote. This is a
potentially powerful warning shot in the board’s direction.
Shareholder proposals potentially serve three other important functions:
checking the actions of conﬂicted directors, facilitating shareholder democracy,
and promoting the beneﬁcial disclosure and use of information.
Conﬂicts of Interest. One justiﬁcation for the shareholder proposal is that
managers and shareholders sometimes have conﬂicting interests. There is good
reason to believe that corporate political spending involves at least one major
conﬂict of interest between shareholders and managers. As has long been recognized in the law and economics literature, diversiﬁed investors are interested
not only in enhancing the value of a particular ﬁrm, but also in establishing
rules that reduce the costs of gain-producing transactions across all ﬁrms.106
Corporate managers, however, are incentivized to adopt whatever practices will
maximize their own ﬁrm’s value. Thus, if managers can engage in political
spending to achieve value-increasing outcomes for the ﬁrm, they will do so;
but diversiﬁed shareholders, who recognize that an arms race of political
spending across ﬁrms is costly to them in the aggregate, would prefer rules that
discourage political spending. By increasing the costs of political spending, dis-

106.
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See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1441 (1989) (“A person who holds a diversiﬁed portfolio has an investment in the
economy as a whole and therefore wants whatever social or private governance rules maximize the value of all ﬁrms put together.”); Fairfax, supra note 6, at 84 (“Diversiﬁed shareholders worry about the impact of a speciﬁc corporation’s policies on the broader society and
market because those policies affect the value of the portfolio of shares such investors
hold.”).
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closure likely discourages it.107 For this reason, it is reasonable for diversiﬁed
investors to favor campaign ﬁnance disclosure on purely economic grounds.108
Since investors and managers have potentially conﬂicting interests regarding
political disclosure, the shareholder proposal mechanism can serve an important role in promoting policies that are value-maximizing for diversiﬁed
shareholders but might otherwise be rejected by corporate managers.
Shareholder Democracy. The shareholder proposal mechanism gives
shareholders what amounts to a right to weigh in and inﬂuence management.109 This right is exercised ﬁrst by the shareholder who makes the proposal, and then by the body of shareholders who vote on it. Indeed, in the
1950s, the shareholder proposal rule was sometimes labeled the shareholder’s
“bill of rights.”110 More recently, scholars have pointed to the shareholder proposal as a mechanism for the exercise of shareholders’ expressive interests in
the corporation, particularly in connection with political spending.111 In this
view, shareholders’ proposal and voting rights have signiﬁcance that derives
from their essential role in the corporation, and is independent from the economic monitoring function that contractarian theorists assign to them. The
idea that shareholders have a right to weigh in on a subset of important matters
is reinforced by the SEC’s position that a proper shareholder proposal is one
that “raises signiﬁcant policy issues” that are “appropriate for a shareholder
vote.”112 By this logic, some matters are simply important enough that share-

107.
108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

Disclosure also likely reduces the possibility that corporate managers will use a company’s
political spending to advance their personal or political agendas.
Other potential economic reasons exist for shareholders to favor campaign ﬁnance disclosure, of course. These include risk monitoring and the reduction of abusive spending practices by corporate managers.
Note that this right is an interesting amalgam of federal law (the right to force the corporation to publish a qualifying proposal in the proxy and distribute it to shareholders) and state
law (the underlying right to bring appropriate matters to a shareholder vote).
See, e.g., David C. Bayne et al., Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Process: The 1954
Amendments, 40 VA. L. REV. 387, 388 (1954) (“[O]f special signiﬁcance in this area of proxy
regulation is the shareholder proposal rule, sometimes described as the shareholders’ bill of
rights.” (footnote omitted)).
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83, 95-96 (2010). But see Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies To Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593, 617-19 (2014) (summarizing and critiquing arguments to this effect).
SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal
/cfslb14e.htm [http://perma.cc/628J-ACTD]; see also Palmiter, supra note 101, at 884-85
(arguing that Rule 14a-8 “offers a singular mechanism for investors to shape particular ﬁrms
and the body politic to deﬁne the American corporation”).
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holders should get a say, even if they are not in the role of ultimate decision
maker.
Information. An additional justiﬁcation for the proposal mechanism is that
Rule 14a-8 gives shareholders the right to “demand and receive from the management a public justiﬁcation of its action.”113 This suggests that the shareholder proposal involves something more than the promotion of valueincreasing proposals or the exercise of shareholders’ expressive rights. It suggests that shareholders learn something of value from management’s public
justiﬁcation—the “statement of opposition” it will publish in the proxy, urging
shareholders to vote against the proposal—and that management’s response to
a proposal can function as an indicator of management quality.114 In addition,
by facilitating information gathering, analysis, and dissemination, the proposal
process may also contribute in important ways to improved decision making by
management.115
Regardless of which theory we adopt to justify the shareholder proposal, its
ends are only served when a qualifying proposal leads to publication in the
proxy and a shareholder vote. If proposal activism is justiﬁed by a conﬂict of
interest between diversiﬁed investors and corporate managers, this will be evident only when diversiﬁed investors express their preferences as a group in the
shareholder vote.116 If the role of shareholders as residual claimants justiﬁes the
use of the proposal mechanism as course correction, settlement prevents shareholders from voting as an interest group. And, at companies where the board
plays little role in proposal settlement, it compromises shareholders’ ability to
convey their views to the board at all. Settlement prevents the exercise of the
proposal vote as a right of shareholding or as the communication of sharehold-
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Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule,
34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 557 (1957).
114. See also Fairfax, supra note 6, at 91-92 (noting that the publication of social and environmental proposals in proxy statements “force[s] corporations to, at least rhetorically, address social issues”). Some scholars have also argued that Rule 14a-8 is justiﬁed as a means to discourage deceptive proxy solicitations. Under this theory, management acts deceptively if it
knows of a shareholder proposal that will be made at the meeting, but omits any mention of
the proposal in the proxy statement. See Palmiter, supra note 101, at 893.
115. Cf. Buchanan et al., supra note 34, at 783 (“Even though U.S. shareholder proposals are not
binding, the process of putting the proposal to a vote in front of all shareholders can facilitate information aggregation and dissemination.”).
116. Not all investors are diversiﬁed. Note also that the stakes for diversiﬁed investors may be
high, since diversiﬁed investors cannot use exit to express their preference for disclosure because political spending is an economy-wide practice and few companies have adopted full
disclosure.
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ers’ expressive interests.117 It also prevents information aggregation through
the public proposal process. If a purpose of the mechanism is to force management to publicly defend its policies and practices, this purpose is thwarted
when proposals can be negotiated away in secrecy. Thus, in virtually all cases,
the private settlement of a proposal undercuts the basic justiﬁcations for the
shareholder proposal framework under Rule 14a-8.
B. Proposal Settlements and Agency Costs
The academic literature has tended to treat proposal settlements as a form
of beneﬁcial, informal shareholder activism. However, this view gets some important facts wrong. Current settlement practices generate few of the beneﬁts
of informal engagement while potentially imposing agency costs on the ﬁrm.
Essentially, a range of potential conﬂicts of interest arise when a shareholder
proposal can be settled in a way that keeps the details of the settlement—
indeed, the very existence of the settlement—secret from other corporate stakeholders. Proposal settlements should thus be distinguished from other forms of
“nonproxy” or informal activism that are largely harmless to the ﬁrm and to the
interests of ﬁrm stakeholders.
1. Management’s Incentives To Settle
Why might corporate management commit the company to new social or
environmental practices in exchange for the withdrawal of a shareholder proposal, particularly if management would otherwise oppose the proposal? One
reason is the corporate law norm that treats shareholder engagement as positive and encourages companies to be responsive to investors.118 Recent legal
and market developments—such as the movement toward majority voting in
director elections, the “say on pay” regime that went into effect in 2011, new
limits on broker voting, the proxy access movement, and the rise of hedge fund
activism—have likely increased managers’ responsiveness to shareholders.119 In

117.

It also prevents the proposal process from serving “as a vehicle for shareholders to organize
and educate themselves” and to “build coalitions with other investors.” Fairfax, supra note 6,
at 92.
118. See, e.g., Justin Fox, How Shareholders Are Ruining American Business, ATLANTIC
(July/Aug. 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/stop-spoiling-the
-shareholders/309381 [http://perma.cc/2ESC-CDJF] (discussing the ascendance of the
“simple doctrine that the job of a chief executive is to keep shareholders happy”).
119. For a description of developments in corporate law and practice since the early 2000s that
have empowered shareholders, see Fairfax, supra note 6, at 61-78, 90-91 (“As managers feel
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a climate of rising shareholder empowerment, managers may simply agree to
accommodate shareholders’ desire for more transparency if they can do so at
minimal cost to the ﬁrm.
A second reason is that companies fear such proposals will succeed. Over
the past ﬁfteen years, the percentage of shareholder support for social and environmental proposals that reach a vote has climbed steadily, from an average of
7.6% in 2000 to 20.1% in 2015.120 Some categories of social and environmental
proposals, including campaign ﬁnance and lobbying disclosure, have enjoyed
much greater success.121 In 2014, campaign ﬁnance or lobbying proposals won
more than 50% support at six companies, and votes at ﬁfteen other companies
achieved 40% to 50% shareholder support.122 In late 2015, the Department of
Labor revised its guidance to expressly permit ﬁduciaries of private sector retirement plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) to take the social and environmental beneﬁts of an investment into
account in investment decisions.123 This is likely to further increase shareholder
support for popular social and environmental proposals that go to a vote. In
light of these trends, it is reasonable for corporate management to conclude
that social and environmental proposals pose a real threat at the shareholder
ballot box.
Although social and environmental shareholder proposals are precatory,
there is pressure on management to implement a proposal if it goes to a vote
and is approved by more than 50% of shareholders. Among other things, ISS
guidelines recommend a case-by-case vote on individual directors or even an

120.

121.

122.

123.
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greater pressure to negotiate with traditional shareholders on corporate governance issues,
they also experience pressure to be more cooperative on these social issues.” (footnote omitted)); and Yockey, supra note 84, at 181-97.
ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 5 ﬁg.4; see also Key Characteristics of Prominent
Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals on Environmental and Social Topics, 2005-2011, supra note 6, at
9 (showing that the total average support for social and environmental proposals that went
to a vote rose from 10% in 2005 to 21% in 2011).
See Key Characteristics of Prominent Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals on Environmental and Social Topics, 2005-2011, supra note 6, at 10 (reporting total average voting support for proposals on speciﬁc social and environmental topics from 2005 to 2011).
ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 5 & ﬁg.5. Two campaign ﬁnance disclosure
proposals, three lobbying disclosure proposals, and one hybrid proposal won in 2014. Id.
Among the proposals that received 40% to 50% support, eight addressed campaign ﬁnance,
four addressed lobbying, and three were “hybrid” proposals addressing both. Id.
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509 (2016).
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entire board if the board fails to implement a winning shareholder proposal.124
The threat of such an outcome may push management to view private settlement as a lower-risk alternative, and one that affords management greater control over the substance of the policy than it would have if it were forced to implement a winning proposal.
A third possibility is that managers prefer to negotiate shareholder proposals away to avoid “negative publicity or reputational damage” for the company, its directors, or its executives.125 Social and environmental shareholder
proposals generally highlight speciﬁc societal harms caused by corporate activity, information the company would likely prefer to suppress. Investors’ critiques are particularly credible when they are published in a proxy statement
because false statements are actionable as securities fraud. It is even possible
that the publication of a proposal in the proxy, or a successful or nearsuccessful vote on a proposal, could result in a stock price effect.126 A company
may conclude that it is cheaper to suppress a proposal through settlement than
to debate its own investor about harms the company may have visited upon
communities, customers, or employees.
Shareholder proposals may pose particular risks for corporate leaders. An
intriguing 2012 study found that in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, shareholder proposals that went to a vote were associated with higher CEO turnover rates afterward.127 A ﬁrm with many shareholder proposals in

124.

See, e.g., United States Summary Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2015 Benchmark Policy
Recommendations, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 14, Recommendation 2.2.1 (Dec. 22,
2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/policy/1_2015-us-summary-voting-guidelines
-updated.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YER-U36T] (recommending a case-by-case vote on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors if “[t]he board failed
to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in
the previous year”); see also Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 104, at 1-2; Ertimur et al.,
supra note 101, at 54 (ﬁnding that a ﬁrm’s implementation of a winning governance-related
proposal was associated with a one-ﬁfth reduction in the probability of director turnover
and noting that “[p]roxy voting services, governance rating agencies and shareholder activists explicitly screen ﬁrms and directors based on their responsiveness to [proposals that receive a majority vote]”).
125. Bauer et al., supra note 6, at 474; see also Palmiter, supra note 101, at 884 (noting that “the
embarrassment of a shareholder rebuff ” may lead managers to “negotiate settlements”);
Yockey, supra note 84, at 183 (discussing the reputational risks of shareholder proposals).
126. Research on stock price effects of shareholder proposals has focused exclusively on corporate
governance proposals, or has lumped all types of proposals together. For a good summary of
the literature on the stock price effects of shareholder proposals, see Rose, supra note 101, at
2189-97.
127. See Buchanan et al., supra note 34, at 796 (analyzing both corporate governance and social
and environmental proposals).
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its proxy statement may appear to analysts and investors to have signiﬁcant investor dissatisfaction. In a recent study, Lee Harris examined “tactical settlements” of contested board elections.128 Although such settlements do not establish ﬁrm policies,129 they shed light on both the incentives at play in
investor-ﬁrm settlements and the consequences of settlement for ﬁrm governance. Harris analyzed data from 190 contested board elections from 2006 to
2009 and found that incumbent boards with poor performance, as measured
by stock price returns, were more likely to settle. Such settlements, Harris concludes, permit underperforming managers to keep their jobs by compromising
the ability of shareholders to discipline management through a vote.130 Similar
motives may prompt managers to negotiate shareholder proposals away. For
essentially self-serving reasons, managers may view settlement as preferable to
public proxy activism.131
In addition, management may perceive litigation risk in opposing shareholder proposals. When a shareholder proposal is included in the proxy statement, corporate management generally publishes a “statement in opposition”
to the proposal, often including in this statement speciﬁc factual assertions
about the company’s political spending activities.132 If these factual statements
are later determined to have been materially false or misleading, the company

128.

Lee Harris, Corporate Elections and Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L. 221, 224 (2014).
Settlements of contested board elections generally involve an agreement by the challenger to
drop the proxy contest in exchange for one or more board seats or other corporate resources.
See id.
130. Id. at 248.
131. Settlement may also allow management to avoid “distraction, mental strife, and possible
embarrassment.” John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by
Union Shareholders 8 (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of L. Ctr. for L. and Soc. Sci., Research Paper Series
No. CLASS15-25, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2666064
[http://perma.cc/L4DP-8UB9].
132. Rule 14a-8 limits the text of a shareholder proposal in the proxy to ﬁve hundred words, but
provides no word limit on management’s response. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016).
129.
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may face liability under Rule 14a-9.133 At least one company, Aetna, has been
sued on this basis.134
Finally, the settlement of shareholder proposals raises the possibility of opportunistic behavior by ﬁrm managers, who may agree to some of a proposal’s
demands in exchange for the shareholder’s support in a vote on some other
matter. Conﬂicts of interest are compounded when a ﬁrm’s practices allow its
officers to settle social and environmental shareholder proposals with minimal
(or no) board involvement. Settlement practices vary from ﬁrm to ﬁrm, but
board approval of settlements typically is not required. Thus, if senior management believes that a proposal reveals information or raises a subject that
could cause friction with the board, and if the ﬁrm’s practices allow it to negotiate the proposal away, the ﬁrm’s officers may settle a proposal that merited
greater board attention. In this way, settlement can divert shareholder concerns
away from scrutiny by the board.
2. Investors’ Incentives To Settle
Why might an investor agree to withdraw a social or environmental proposal in exchange for a company’s partial adoption of the demanded reforms?
One reason is that, from the point of view of the socially responsible investor,
settlement may actually be preferable to a vote because of the limits that securities regulation places on proposals. The Rule 14a-8 regime itself, which was not
designed to facilitate social and environmental policy reforms, may actually
channel social and environmental activism toward settlement. One example is
Rule 14a-8’s word cap on shareholder proposals. The rule limits proposals to
ﬁve hundred words, a length that is too short to articulate complex standards
and that nearly forecloses the use of deﬁned terms. A shareholder who wants
the corporation to adopt a detailed rule must utilize a settlement agreement.
Part III discusses this idea in greater detail.
133.

Id. § 240.14a-9. For example, in its 2015 proxy statement, FedEx published a “Board of Directors’ Statement in Opposition” to a shareholder proposal on campaign ﬁnance disclosure.
In that statement, FedEx asserted that the company “does not make corporate contributions
to groups organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than membership dues, event sponsorships, and contributions to the organizational committees of the
Democratic and Republican national party conventions and the annual conferences of the
Democratic and Republican Governors Associations.” FedEx Corp., 2015 Annual Meeting of
Stockholders (Schedule 14A), at 72 (Sept. 28, 2015). If this statement were false at the time it
was made, it would open FedEx up to potential liability under Rule 14a-9.
134. In 2013, Aetna became embroiled in a shareholder’s securities fraud lawsuit on this basis. See
Complaint at 9-10, Silberstein v. Aetna, Inc. (No. 13-cv-8759) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2013), 2013
WL 6632470.
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Another possibility, however, is that shareholder proponents may extract
private beneﬁts from settlements. This can happen in a number of ways. First,
a socially responsible investment fund’s reputation is enhanced when it can
claim to have changed a corporation’s social or environmental policies. In fact,
SRI funds commonly advertise their proposal settlements without divulging
the details of the deal.135 This reputational beneﬁt helps recruit new clients to
the fund and bolsters the fund’s negotiating clout with other corporations.
Some investors outsource their shareholder proposal activity to consultants or
lawyers who must justify the fees they charge. The funds and their consultants
know that the likely outcome of a shareholder vote on a social and environmental proposal is failure. Although voting trends reveal growing support for such
proposals, most do not win 50% or more of the shareholder vote. Thus, funds
and their consultants may perceive that the reputational beneﬁt of settling a
proposal for a small policy gain—a reputational beneﬁt which the proponent
alone will enjoy—is greater than the investor’s pro rata share of the beneﬁts the
whole ﬁrm will enjoy if the proposal goes to a vote.136 The shareholder proponent’s choice to extract a private beneﬁt by settling the proposal deprives the
corporation’s other shareholders of a vote on a potentially socially beneﬁcial or
value-increasing proposal (or the chance to defeat it).137
The shareholder proponent will enjoy reputational beneﬁts even if the
company eventually stops complying with the deal. Thus, a shareholder proponent not only has a motive to settle for watered-down social and environmental policies, but has little incentive to monitor the company’s compliance or
to enforce the settlement. Essentially, the shareholder proponent may walk
away from the deal with an enhanced reputation at the expense of others—
fellow shareholders or third parties who stood to gain from policy reforms.
135.

SRI funds and public pension funds sometimes issue press releases to announce settlements,
and many provide summary reports on their shareholder activism. These press releases and
reports rarely provide details of the agreements struck. For an example, see The 2016 Proxy
Season: Your Final Exam, CLEAN YIELD ASSET MGMT. (2016), http://www.cleanyield.com
/2016-proxy-season-ﬁnal-exam [http://perma.co/2GPM-TCNP], which identiﬁes withdrawn political spending disclosure proposals in 2016 at Corning, Inc., Lincoln National,
and Southern Company; notes “agreement reached”; and provides no details about the
terms of the agreement.
136. The fund or fund manager, rather than the beneﬁciaries of the fund, enjoys the reputational
beneﬁt, highlighting the potential divergence of interests between fund managers and fund
beneﬁciaries. For a thoughtful discussion of the agency costs of fund intermediation, see
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889-95 (2013).
137. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1296 (2009)
(discussing the possibility that shareholder empowerment “may confer power on shareholders whose interests diverge from those of the broader shareholder class”).
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Second, shareholders may bring a proposal solely for the purpose of bargaining it away, or to put pressure on management to accede to a different demand.138 A proposal that highlights societal harms caused by the company may
be a powerful bargaining chip for a shareholder, particularly if corporate management fears negative publicity or already stands in a weakened position.
Lastly, proposal settlements also create informational asymmetries. In the
process of negotiating a social or environmental proposal, for example, a
shareholder proponent may learn information that the ﬁrm’s management considers non-material, but that is nonetheless of interest to some shareholders.
Shareholder proponents obtain information about management quality during
the negotiation process that may be valuable in its own right. Shareholder press
releases that announce a withdrawn proposal typically commend corporate
management for its responsiveness to shareholder concerns; depending on the
negotiations and their outcome, such signals of management quality may be
misleading. Finally, in the typical case, only the shareholder proponent is in a
position to evaluate whether a ﬁrm has complied with an agreement—
information that also bears on management quality.
Importantly, one shareholder’s settlement of a proposal potentially compromises other shareholders’ rights and interests under Rule 14a-8 and state
corporate law. First, settlement cuts off the participation of other shareholders
in the policy reform by preventing a shareholder vote. For all of the reasons
outlined above in Section II.A, this defeats the economic and noneconomic reasons to provide a proposal mechanism in the ﬁrst place. In addition, a de facto
“ﬁrst in time” rule exists for shareholder proposals: after a company receives its
ﬁrst proposal on a topic in advance of an upcoming shareholder meeting, Rule
14a-8 allows it to exclude all subsequent proposals on the same or a substantially similar topic.139 Thus a shareholder who submits the ﬁrst proposal on a subject occupies the ﬁeld, requiring latecomers to withdraw or have their proposals

138.

For an exposition on the risks of activist shareholder self-dealing, see Iman Anabtawi &
Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008). For a discussion of opportunistic governance proposals by shareholders, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 884-86 (2005); for a reply,
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1735, 1756 (2006).
139. In 2015, Walden Asset Management withdrew a shareholder proposal on political spending
disclosures that it had submitted to Express Scripts “because a similar resolution was on
the ballot.” Research & Engagement Brief, Second Quarter 2015, WALDEN ASSET MGMT. 1
(2015), http://waldenassetmgmt.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=181906 [http://perma.cc
/Z6HG-2WLB]. In other words, another investor had beaten it to the punch. Note, however, that despite the withdrawal, “the company agreed to continue discussion and to consider
the request.” Id.
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formally excluded. If the lead shareholder goes on to settle the proposal, a latecomer’s ability to renew a proposal is greatly compromised; many of the settlements reviewed for this Article were ﬁnalized just days before the proxy was
published. The matter is further complicated by a provision of Rule 14a-8 that
allows a company to exclude a proposal it has “substantially implemented.”140
Simply by settling a campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposal, for example, a
shareholder potentially triggers the “substantially implemented” provision of
the rule for follow-on proposals seeking broader disclosure.
Since settlement defeats the purposes of the shareholder proposal mechanism and imposes potential agency costs on the ﬁrm, it follows that settlements
should be rare. Yet settlements are not rare; and, as the next Section explains,
social and environmental settlements constitute a slowly growing category.
C. Social and Environmental Settlements Versus Governance Settlements
A subset of institutional investors have specialized in campaign ﬁnance disclosure activism, pursuing the same set of reforms at multiple companies.
These investors appear to play the role of “social policy intermediaries,” a variation on the role of “governance intermediaries” in agency capitalism, according
to a compelling theory advanced by Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon.141 In
Gilson and Gordon’s theory, governance intermediaries assume the costs to develop business strategy proposals at a ﬁrm and to convince rationally reticent
institutional investors to support them.142 In the theory, governance intermediaries are specialists who “potentiate institutional voice.”143 Here, activist shareholders tee up social policy reforms at low cost to other shareholders.144 But
shareholder activists do not proﬁt from social activism in the same way that
hedge funds proﬁt from governance activism. A hedge fund achieves gains by
spearheading governance and business strategy reforms that raise the target
ﬁrm’s stock price, thus increasing the value of the hedge fund’s own stock. Social and environmental reforms, in contrast, often have little effect on stock
prices. Settlement may look particularly attractive to the proponent of a social
or environmental proposal because settlement minimizes costs that are poorly
offset by far-off or hard-to-quantify social or environmental gains.

140.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2016).
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 136, at 867.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Shareholder proponents save costs themselves by relying on nonproﬁt organizations such as
the CPA for proposal templates, monitoring services, and other assistance.
141.
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Settlements that set social or environmental standards have become more
common than settlements on governance issues. At the same time, social and
environmental policy changes are less transparent to shareholders than corporate governance changes. In both 2014 and 2015, investors submitted more
shareholder proposals on social and environmental topics than they did on
corporate governance topics (excluding executive compensation proposals from
the calculation).145 However, corporate governance topics were more likely to
go to a vote.146 In other words, there appears to be more behind-the-scenes
deal making on social and environmental subjects than on matters of ﬁrm governance.147
Most changes to a ﬁrm’s governance are made as amendments to the certiﬁcate of incorporation or the bylaws; the former require shareholder approval,
and both kinds of amendments are publicly disclosed in ﬁlings to the SEC.148
Thus, if a shareholder brings a proposal for a governance change and it is settled in a deal between management and the shareholder, management either
ends up submitting the agreed-upon amendment for shareholder approval, or
it must ﬁle the amendment with the SEC within four business days. Either
way, the governance change is transparent to shareholders and the market, and
the value of the change is swiftly impounded into the stock price.

145.

ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3 (reporting that in 2015, 45% of proposals addressed social and environmental policy, 43% addressed governance issues, and 12% addressed executive compensation).
146. Id. (reporting that in 2015, 40% of social and environmental proposals were withdrawn,
while only 10% of governance proposals and 16% of executive compensation proposals were
withdrawn); see also Bauer et al., supra note 6, at 473 (ﬁnding that between 1997 and 2009,
corporate social responsibility proposals were withdrawn more often than corporate governance proposals); Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 104, at 25 tbl.3 (reporting that from
1989 to 1991, 10.4% of corporate governance proposals were withdrawn, compared to 28.5%
of “social issue” proposals, while from 1993-1995, 17.6% of corporate governance proposals
were withdrawn, compared to 43.5% of “social issue” proposals).
147. ISS’s numbers suggest that the highest rates of withdrawal of shareholder proposals on social and environmental matters in 2015 were for proposals concerning a company’s employment policies on sexual orientation (95% withdrawn), its policies on board diversity (79%
withdrawn), and its policies on data privacy and security (73% withdrawn). ISS 2015 Proxy
Season Review, supra note 6, at 8 ﬁg.9.
148. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0060, FORM 8-K, at 17, http://
www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [http://perma.cc/5WWJ-RYJL] (requiring the disclosure of amendments to articles of incorporation or bylaws and the amendments to be
ﬁled as exhibits pursuant to Item 601 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2002)). See
generally Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date;
Correction, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,370 (Aug. 10, 2004).
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Social and environmental proposals are generally not brought in the form
of amendments to the certiﬁcate of incorporation or the bylaws. This stems
from concerns about encroaching upon the board’s authority to manage the
corporation under state law. Instead, social and environmental standards are
typically established in the sort of downstream corporate policies that are not
available to shareholders and the public. Some ﬁrms publish social and environmental policy documents on their public websites, but others do not. Thus,
new social and environmental policies can be set in a settlement and implemented without ex ante or ex post transparency to shareholders—and therefore
without enhancing the allocative efficiency of stock prices. That is, when information about a new social policy is not communicated to the market, investors cannot price the policy change into the stock, and the market itself fails to
allocate capital in a way that captures the economic signiﬁcance of policy reforms (or a lack of policy reforms) at particular companies across the economy.
The lack of transparency also makes social and environmental proposals more
vulnerable than governance proposals to opportunism, conﬂicts of interest, and
information asymmetries, with the result that they may involve greater costs to
the ﬁrm.
No good reason justiﬁes these different transparency outcomes. Critics may
argue that matters of corporate governance address the shareholder’s corporate
contract, while social and environmental policies do not. Yet both types of proposals implicate a shareholder’s rights and interests as a shareholder. If a matter
is both “appropriate for a shareholder vote” and opposed by management, it
should not be diverted to private deal making. For example, once a shareholder
avails itself of the proposal mechanism on campaign ﬁnance disclosure, another
shareholder cannot bring the same or a substantially related proposal at the
same meeting. And depending on how the proposal process concludes, competing shareholders may have to wait years to renew a proposal. The mere fact
that other shareholders’ interests are affected by the acts of the original shareholder proponent suggests that transparency is needed. As already discussed,
settlement itself disenfranchises shareholders by preventing a vote from taking
place; this subverts a privilege of shareholding, much in the way that allowing
management to unilaterally alter the corporate contract would. In short, once
the SEC has determined that a subject matter transcends a company’s ordinary
business and is appropriate for subsidized discussion in the proxy, shareholders
have a stake in learning about side deals on the matter.
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iii. private disclosure reform and electoral integrity
A. The Trend Toward Private Ordering
There is strong agreement among election law scholars and political scientists that existing campaign ﬁnance disclosure laws do not produce electoral
transparency.149 Even Justice Anthony Kennedy, who authored the majority
opinion in Citizens United that strongly endorsed campaign ﬁnance disclosure,
has observed that campaign ﬁnance reporting is “not working the way it
should.”150
Corporate electoral spending is particularly opaque under existing disclosure law. Corporations are only rarely required by public law to disclose anything about their electoral spending, and virtually all mandatory disclosures of
corporate electoral spending are made not by the corporations themselves, but
by the recipients of corporations’ funds, such as “Super PACs.”151 Corporate
payments to politically active 501(c) nonproﬁts, including trade associations
and social welfare organizations, are generally not reported by those organizations, and thus are not transparent; these are commonly referred to as “dark
money” payments.152 In the 2012 federal election, an estimated $310 million—
roughly 29% of reported outside spending—came from dark money organizations.153 The proportion of this spending that originated from corporate treasuries is unknown.154 Evidence suggests that undisclosed spending will play an
even greater role in the 2016 federal election. By the end of January 2016, dark-

149.

150.

151.

152.
153.
154.

See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure
for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 685 (2012) (“[O]ur laws fail to
provide for effective reporting of the campaign ﬁnance activities of independent committees.”).
Marcia Coyle, Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term “Swing Vote,” NAT’L L.J. ONLINE
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202740827841/Justice-Anthony
-Kennedy-Loathes-the-Term-Swing-Vote [http://perma.cc/T4EN-LYVH].
Corporations are rarely required to disclose their own electoral expenditures because they
rarely engage in the types of spending that require such reporting. Mostly, corporations seek
to inﬂuence elections through donations to outside spending groups. See Haan, supra note
74, at 1158-60.
See Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895 (2016) (describing and analyzing the “dark money problem”).
Haan, supra note 74, at 1151.
Id. In addition, as much as $100 million in unreported outside spending on “issue ads” also
came from unknown sources. Id. The numbers address only spending on federal elections in
2012 and exclude “dark money” spending on state and local elections.
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money groups had already spent $213 million on political ads in the 2016 election cycle, nearly double the amount spent over the same period by the campaigns themselves and by Super PACs.155 An August 2016 analysis found that
the volume of television and cable ads purchased by dark money groups has
been increasing, although the proportion of ads from dark money groups in
the 2016 election has declined relative to Super PACs.156
Corporate campaign ﬁnance is also opaque because the little information
that is disclosed is highly fragmented. Under existing public law, there is no
one place to ﬁnd all disclosures of a corporation’s electoral expenditures across
jurisdictions. To obtain information about a company’s electoral spending in all
elections, one must review disclosure reports on the FEC’s website as well as on
the websites of election regulators in all ﬁfty states. This makes it costly and
time-consuming for the public, or for investors, to understand corporate political spending on a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis.
Private ordering has emerged as a potential solution to campaign ﬁnance
problems caused or exacerbated by Citizens United. In 2012, two opposing candidates in a Massachusetts Senate race, Scott Brown and Elizabeth Warren,
used a self-enforcing contract to limit outside spending in the election.157 The
contract, which required each candidate to donate 50% of the total outside
spending that beneﬁtted his or her campaign to charity, successfully reduced
the amount of outside money spent in the race.158 However, the success of the
Brown-Warren contract has not led to widespread adoption by candidates of
self-enforcing contracts as a private regulatory tool.
Private disclosure reform has taken off more briskly. Since at least the
1990s, shareholder activists have sought greater transparency of corporate elec-

155.

Bill Allison, Dark Money Dominates Political Ad Spending, BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan.
28, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-01-28/dark-money-dominates
-political-ad-spending [http://perma.cc/R86Z-XCNZ]. Approximately $161 million of this
amount was spent on “targeted issues” ads with the remaining $52.5 million funding ads
that speciﬁcally mentioned a candidate for federal office. Id.
156. Wesleyan Media Project/Center for Responsive Politics Special Report: Outside Group Activity,
2000-2016, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2016), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu
/blog/disclosure-report [http://perma.cc/M4AV-R45T] (“[E]ven though the majority of
spending by groups may be full disclosure, the total volume of spending that is undisclosed
has been rising.”).
157. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 755
(2014).
158. See id. at 786-88. Similar contracts have been proposed in more than a dozen elections, but
few have been signed. See People’s Pledge, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org
/issues/money-in-politics/peoples-pledge [http://perma.cc/2JEX-XUQL].
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toral expenditures through corporate governance mechanisms.159 So-called
“voluntary” corporate disclosure has become an important source of information about corporate activity in general, and shareholder activists have
sought increased corporate disclosure across a range of subjects.160
The CPA has documented a steady rise in the number of S&P 500 companies making disclosures, and commentators have suggested that their purpose
is to inform voters about the sources of campaign ﬁnance.161 In 2015, Justice
Kennedy discussed campaign ﬁnance disclosure in a dissent in Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar, suggesting that internet disclosure can be particularly effective
“[w]hether as a result of disclosure laws or a candidate’s voluntary decision to
make the campaign transparent.”162 The implication is that, if mandatory campaign ﬁnance law has left gaps in electoral transparency, voluntary disclosures
can ﬁll them in.

159.

Activists have been making political spending proposals for several decades; John and Klein
identiﬁed seven proposals demanding “[i]nformation on political donations” in the 1991-92
proxy season. John & Klein, supra note 6, at 48 tbl.2.
160. In 2013, a small number of companies began disclosing on their websites payments made to
nonproﬁt policy development organizations, such as the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC), even though lobbying disclosure laws do not require disclosure of such
payments. See, e.g., Transparency, GOOGLE (Dec. 23, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web
/20131223181556/http://www.google.com/publicpolicy/transparency.html [http://perma.cc
/N36W-DLG4] (noting Google’s membership in ALEC but not providing payment information). That same year, several major telecommunications companies committed to publishing disclosures of law enforcement agency requests for customer information. See Marcy
Gordon, AT&T Says It Will Publish Info on Data Requests, USA TODAY (Dec.
20, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/12/20/att-says-it-will
-publish-reports-on-data-requests/4146519 [http://perma.cc/WWM4-L3SW]. Microsoft’s
public website, for example, features a Transparency Hub with links to ten categories of disclosure that are not mandated by public law. See Our Commitment to Transparency, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/csr/transparencyhub [http://perma.cc/AUM4
-E235].
161. See, e.g., David Saleh Rauf, More Election Spending in Light, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS,
Jan. 8, 2016, at A3 (noting a “growing trend” in which businesses “voluntarily” reveal information about political spending “to ensure that shareholders and the public know how corporate funds are being spent on politics”).
162. 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1684 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy’s
statement is perplexing because a candidate does not control the transparency of outside
spending groups that support or oppose the candidate’s election. Other private actors, such
as the heads of 501(c) nonproﬁts, possess the power to decide to “make the campaign transparent.” Id.

305

the yale law journal

126:262

2016

B. The Promise of Private Law
Disclosure is an essential means of regulating elections in the public interest.163 The Supreme Court has long recognized strong state interests in preserving electoral integrity by “promoting transparency and accountability in
the electoral process.”164 The Court has connected disclosure to electoral integrity for nearly a century and has endorsed citizen interests in using disclosure
to monitor the political process and to learn and understand how the political
process works.165 Disclosure advances constitutional values, the Supreme Court
163.

See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 199 (2010) (noting that public disclosure helps cure inadequacies in monitoring and enforcement by regulatory authorities and “promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent others cannot”); Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976)
(per curiam); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934) (“Congress reached the
conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections. The verity of this conclusion reasonably cannot be denied.”); see also United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (stating that the purpose of lobbying disclosure is “to
maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process”); Briffault, supra note 149, at 690
(noting that Doe v. Reed “connected the integrity and voter information concerns in pointing
to an overarching public interest in monitoring and understanding the workings of the political process”).
164. Doe, 561 U.S. at 198; Briffault, supra note 149, at 689-90.
165. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37 (2003) (discussing interests in regulating elections to protect the integrity of the political process); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (noting that “a State has a compelling interest in protecting
voters from confusion and undue inﬂuence”); id. at 211 (recognizing an individual’s “right to
cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud”); Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) (“A State indisputably has a
compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (“We have recognized that, ‘as a practical matter, there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort
of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’” (quoting Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))); id. at 796 (“There can be no question about the legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will
in a general election.”); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
210-11 (1982) (affirming the state’s interest in regulating elections to protect the integrity of
the electoral process); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981)
(same); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers, 352
U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (“[W]hat is involved here is the integrity of our electoral process, and,
not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.”); id. at 575 (discussing the interest of Congress in regulating elections to “sustain the
active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of
government”); Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545 (noting that Congress “undoubtedly” has the
power to legislate to “safeguard” a federal election “from the improper use of money to inﬂuence the result . . . as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments
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has written, “by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to
public view.”166 Thus, citizens have a signiﬁcant democratic interest in ensuring
that corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure is effective at helping voters understand the role of corporate donors in ﬁnancing public elections.
Given the signiﬁcant citizen interests at stake in disclosure regulation, we
might ask whether private ordering can reform campaign ﬁnance disclosure in
a way that advances democratic values. Jody Freeman has argued that private
lawmaking should be “harness[ed] . . . to serve public goals.”167 Within the
context of the ﬁrm, Lisa M. Fairfax has written that shareholders can, and do,
use shareholder activism to advance the interests of other corporate stakeholders, such as employees and consumers.168 Private ordering might be justiﬁed as
a method of electoral regulation if it can effectively promote citizen interests in
transparency by helping voters monitor and understand the ways in which
companies spend money to inﬂuence elections.
Private campaign ﬁnance disclosure law has an edge over public law because it can serve a purpose that is forbidden to public law: it can seek to reduce
corporate political speech. The state may not intentionally chill political
speech—the First Amendment forbids this—and thus a legislature or government agency may not use mandatory disclosure for the purpose of reducing
corporate political spending. However, there is no reason why private investors
cannot use investor-ﬁrm agreements to suppress spending. Indeed, a number
of shareholder proposals have openly sought to do so by asking shareholders to
vote in favor of policies prohibiting political spending altogether.169 There are

166.
167.
168.
169.

and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption”); id. at 548 (affirming Congress’s conclusion that “public
disclosure of political contributions, together with . . . other details, would tend to prevent
the corrupt use of money to affect elections”).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82.
Freeman, supra note 94, at 549.
See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 57.
See, e.g., Starbucks Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 57 (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/829224/000119312513024028/d455402ddef14a.htm
[http://perma.cc/Z6YU
-8X46] (proposing, on behalf of Harrington Investments, Inc., that “the board of directors
adopt a policy prohibiting the use of corporate funds for any political election or campaign,
including direct or indirect contributions or to candidates, and corporate expenditures for
electioneering communications, as well as prohibiting the establishment of a Starbucks political action committee”). This proposal received almost 4% shareholder support at Starbucks’s 2013 annual shareholder meeting, and Harrington Investments submitted it again in
2014. See Starbucks Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (March 20, 2013), http://www
.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000082922413000019/sbux-32213x8xk.htm [http://
perma.cc/KF5L-F2P9] (reporting voting results); Starbucks Corp., Proxy Statement Pursu-
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economic, expressive, and democratic reasons that investors might seek to curb
corporate electoral spending—either directly or through disclosure requirements—and private ordering appears to be the only constitutionally permissible way to pursue these purposes.
In addition, disclosure standards set through private ordering are not subject to the First Amendment scrutiny that applies to the content of public law
disclosure mandates. The emerging private disclosure standards described in
this Part require reporting of information that would almost certainly pass constitutional muster under Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, such as the dollar
amounts of candidate contributions and independent expenditures.170 But the
emerging standards also seek to ﬁll some gaps in public disclosure law, by requiring disclosure of information that has not traditionally been compelled by
public election law; as a result, these disclosure mandates have never been tested in a First Amendment challenge. The primary example is disclosure of dark
money payments to 501(c) nonproﬁt organizations. Other, untested categories
of information subject to the private disclosure rules include a company’s rationale for engaging in political spending and a company’s decision-making
process for electoral expenditures. Although citizens might ﬁnd such information useful in evaluating candidates for public office, courts increasingly
have shown a willingness to cut back public law disclosure mandates aimed at
corporations on First Amendment grounds.171 Private disclosure law appears to
be the path of least resistance toward these forms of socially beneﬁcial disclosure.
The emerging private disclosure standards at companies settling shareholder proposals improve upon public campaign ﬁnance disclosure in at least two
regards: they require companies to publish a single report of electoral expenditures across multiple jurisdictions, and they require disclosure of spending
without temporal limitations.

ant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 48 (Jan. 24,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000120677414000304/starbucks
_def14a.htm [http://perma.cc/2798-XRBK] (propounding a similar proposal). The 2014
proposal received less than 3% support, falling short of the 6% voting support required by
Rule 14a-8 for the proposal to be submitted for a third consecutive year. See Starbucks
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 19, 2014) http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/829224/000082922414000011/sbux-3252014x8xk.htm [http://perma.cc/YUS3
-FNZV] (reporting voting results).
170. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (discussing governmental interests served by campaign ﬁnance
disclosure).
171. See, e.g., Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that a
disclosure mandate in the Conﬂict Minerals Rule violated the First Amendment).
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Public election law tends to produce fragmented corporate spending disclosure, reported to different jurisdictions in separate reports. Private disclosure
standards have ﬁxed this problem by requiring companies to consolidate their
disclosures in a single report. This innovation makes it much easier for citizens
and investors to obtain a holistic picture of a company’s disclosed expenditures.
The ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm approach is important not only to investors, whose economic
interest in the corporation naturally focuses them on aggregate expenditures,
but also to citizens concerned about the growing political power of business entities. However, ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm reporting still presents challenges for voters who
seek information about campaign funding by candidate; to discover which
companies ﬁnancially supported or opposed a candidate, one would have to review the websites of hundreds of corporations.
Federal and state campaign ﬁnance laws have also tended to deﬁne categories of electoral spending that are subject to disclosure in part by the timing of
the expenditure in relation to the date of an election. For example, a radio or
television advertisement that discusses a candidate in an upcoming federal election is not an “electioneering communication,” subject to speciﬁc disclosure requirements, unless it airs within sixty days of a general election.172 This temporal cut-off has been widely critiqued for creating a loophole that allows ads
aired three or four months before an election to evade disclosure.173 Proposal
settlements, however, have overwhelmingly adopted a different approach.
They require ﬁrms to produce comprehensive annual or semi-annual reports
that disclose all spending intended to inﬂuence an election or ballot initiative
during the period covered by the report, regardless of when the spending occurred in relation to an election. Thus, private disclosure law holds at least the
promise of more authentically representing all corporate payments to inﬂuence
a given election cycle.
Yet for the reasons described in the next Section, the potential beneﬁts of
privately negotiated disclosure have been poorly realized.

172.

52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A) (2014).
173. See, e.g., Keenan Steiner, Under-the-Radar Political Ads: A Guide to Electioneering Communications, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (May 3, 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/05/03
/brief-guide-electioneering-communications [http://perma.cc/9DP8-VWPQ] (providing a
concise explanation of the loophole). Recognizing that spenders may seek to inﬂuence elections with ads that run before the sixty-day cut-off, scholars have advocated expanding the
statutory time period. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 149, at 704-05 (advocating an increase
from 60 days to 120 days before a general election). The proposed DISCLOSE Act that has
stalled in Congress would have made this change. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong.
§ 202 (2010).
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C. Private Law Comes Up Short
1. Participation and Transparency
Proposal settlements that set campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards have
lacked transparency to citizens and corporate stakeholders, have excluded key
parties from participation, and have invited participation by third parties—
notably proxy advisory services—whose motives are opaque and likely do not
align with citizen interests.
Dominance of Institutional Investors. All forty-two of the shareholder
proposal settlements reviewed for this study were initiated by institutional investors, who dominate the process to the exclusion of others—shareholders and
voters—who have a stake in corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure. These other stakeholders do not participate in settlements, and if they learn of the settlements at all, it is after the process is completed.
Shareholder proposals are sent directly to the company’s principal executive
office and, unless they end up in the proxy or a no-action letter request, they
can leave little trace of their existence.174 Neither the public nor other corporate
stakeholders are notiﬁed that a policymaking settlement is underway; the entire process plays out behind closed doors. Depending upon the company’s internal governance, even the board of directors may play a minimal role in supervising settlements. The lack of transparency ensures minimal participation
and oversight by parties other than the individual shareholder proponent and
company management, even though the policy addressed by the proposal must
be “signiﬁcant” and concern a matter the SEC has deemed “appropriate for a
shareholder vote” to survive Rule 14a-8’s exclusions.175 The agreement itself,
even if it is reduced to a written contract signed by both investor and corporate
management, is not ﬁled with the SEC or disclosed to investors. This makes it
impossible for the citizenry to know what, precisely, the company has agreed to
disclose or to determine whether the company has complied with its own disclosure commitment.176

174.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e) (2016).
175. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14e
.htm [http://perma.cc/2GS3-ZM8M].
176. Although a settlement agreement typically establishes a corporate policy, the policy itself is
not always publicly available on the company’s website. Additionally, companies that do post
policies on their websites generally post current policies and not older versions; thus, it is
not possible to determine if the company’s posted policy is the same one it agreed to in the
settlement agreement. For these reasons, the agreement itself is the best evidence of the
company’s commitment.
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Settlements raise democratic participation concerns because they are negotiated exclusively between representatives of corporate management and certain
shareholders. Citizens, civic groups, political scientists, election law experts,
elected officials, and even a company’s other shareholders, employees, creditors, and additional stakeholders are all excluded from the process. This means
that a full range of citizen interests is not represented in the standard setting;
instead, all parties permitted to participate are motivated to advance the corporate enterprise. There is no meaningful opportunity for ordinary citizens to
play any role in debating or negotiating the disclosure standards, even through
a representative.
Federal securities regulation plays a key role in limiting participation in private standard setting. Eligibility requirements in Rule 14a-8 make a shareholder
eligible to submit a proposal for a shareholder vote only if it has continuously
held, for at least one year, a minimum of $2,000 or 1% of the ﬁrm’s securities
entitled to be voted at the meeting.177 Virtually everyone interviewed for this
Article, on all sides of the process, characterized this requirement as minimal.
This view—that a $2,000 stockholding threshold is low and easy to meet—
reﬂects, of course, the bias of big players in the equity capital markets. Although it is difficult to estimate how many Americans could indeﬁnitely set
aside $2,000 as the cost of participating in private ordering at a single ﬁrm, it
should be clear that the $2,000 threshold excludes a great number of citizens
from participation.
Citizen interests might be furthered, at least in theory, by the participation
of public pension funds, which act on behalf of millions of middle-income
Americans.178 However, this would require legal change. Fund managers are
ﬁduciaries acting on behalf of the funds’ beneﬁciaries, but they do not act in a
representative capacity. Thus, pension funds do not survey their beneﬁciaries
to learn their views on matters of corporate social and environmental policy,
nor would fund managers be obliged to advance those views through their official acts if they did learn of them. Fund beneﬁciaries are so distanced from proposal negotiations by layers of intermediation that most of them probably have
no idea that fund managers are haggling over campaign ﬁnance disclosure
standards on their behalf.179
177.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2016).
178. The New York State Common Retirement Fund alone has more than one million members,
retirees, and beneﬁciaries. See Pension Fund Overview, OFF. N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER (Mar. 31,
2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/snapshot.htm [http://perma.cc/G335-CLLT].
179. In 2004, the SEC began requiring registered management investment companies to report
their proxy voting on Form N-PX, reasoning that “increased transparency will enable fund
shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance activities of portfolio

311

the yale law journal

126:262

2016

Economics shapes the accountability of participants in proposal settlements. Because the costs of private disclosure reform at a ﬁrm are borne primarily by the shareholder proponent, large investors are likely to be disproportionately represented in private deal making. An investment fund will not
pursue socially beneﬁcial disclosure reforms at a company in its portfolio unless
its managers believe the beneﬁts to the fund outweigh the costs. Large investment ﬁrms are better able to bear the costs of activism and spread them across
funds; therefore, such ﬁrms are more likely to ﬁnd activism cost-effective.180
Under some circumstances, the size of a fund’s position in a ﬁrm’s stock may
also factor into the fund’s cost-beneﬁt analysis; a larger position would make a
beneﬁcial reform more valuable to the fund, and increase the likelihood that
the fund would initiate deal making. And, of course, because an investor’s bargaining power turns mainly on the proportion of a company’s stock it owns,
investors with large stockholdings will have greater inﬂuence with management. A 2015 study—the only comprehensive study of proposal withdrawals to
date—found that social and environmental proposals had a predicted likelihood of withdrawal of 46.8% if the proponent was an institutional investor,
but only a predicted likelihood of 12.6% if the proponent was not.181 All of this
suggests that the deeper the pocket of the investor, the greater the economic incentives for the investor to pursue proposal settlements. Thus, even among investors, the settlement of shareholder proposals is a game of elites. And when a
participant pays the cost for a reform, it may feel justiﬁed in seeking private
gains from the reform.
Agency problems inherent in intermediary capitalism inﬂuence the social
and environmental standards that are set through proposal settlements. For example, the beneﬁciaries of public pension funds—teachers, ﬁreﬁghters, and police officers—may have different political interests from the ﬁnancial services

companies.” Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003); see 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.30b1-4 (2016). Under the new rule, mutual funds must disclose their votes on shareholder proposals that go to a vote, but are not required to disclose proposal settlement activity.
180. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 69 (2007) (“[S]ince the active investors incur all the costs
associated with such activism (while the beneﬁts accrue to all shareholders), only shareholders with large positions are likely to obtain a large enough return on their investment to justify the costs.”); Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals,
66 J. FIN. 1579, 1603 (2011) (explaining that blockholders are most likely to submit shareholder proposals because “their beneﬁts from proposal submission are sufficiently high to
overcome the associated costs”).
181. Bauer et al., supra note 6, at 482.
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professionals who manage the funds. Yet it is a fund’s managers who determine
the social and environmental agenda for the fund, craft the social and environmental policies demanded in proposals, and agree to a company’s offer of settlement. Since proposals can be bargained away more or less in secret, a fund
manager might compromise on a disclosure standard in a way that fund beneﬁciaries would not approve, or even bring a social and environmental proposal
as a bargaining chip to extract a private beneﬁt from the company. Thus, settlement outcomes may advance the political and personal interests of fund
managers at the expense of fund beneﬁciaries.
Finally, the fact that intra-ﬁrm bargaining power is distributed on the basis
of shareholding means that private lawmaking is more likely to “stick” at ﬁrms
with certain characteristics. Certain types of ﬁrms, including those with less insider control and greater institutional shareholding, are more likely to be targeted for shareholder proposals on political spending.182 It is likely that such
ﬁrms are targeted because their ownership structures make it easier for activist
shareholders to build support for their proposals, which gives them greater leverage to settle proposals. But the democratic problem is that ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm electoral transparency may be determined by a set of company characteristics rather than by policies in the public interest.
Inﬂuence of Proxy Advisory Firms. An additional set of private actors,
proxy advisory ﬁrms, have played a key role in setting corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards through private ordering. Proxy advisory ﬁrms are
for-proﬁt intermediaries that publish ﬁrm-speciﬁc information for institutional
investor clients, including recommendations on how to vote on shareholder
proposals.183 Proxy advisory ﬁrms inﬂuence private standard setting in two key
ways: ﬁrst, by making recommendations about whether shareholders should
vote in favor of speciﬁc campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposals and, second, by
pressuring ﬁrms to implement shareholder proposals that receive majority
shareholder support.
Proxy advisory ﬁrms issue speciﬁc recommendations about how their clients should vote on shareholder proposals regarding corporate campaign ﬁ-

182.

See, e.g., Min & You, supra note 70, at 18 (observing that companies targeted by shareholder
proposals on political spending were “less likely to have insider control and more likely to
have a majority of outstanding shares held by institutions”). More generally, Chidambaran
and Woidtke found that ﬁrms with withdrawn “social issue” proposals from 1989 to 1995
tended to be larger than control ﬁrms and to have outperformed the market prior to the
proposal. See Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 104, at 26 tbl.4.
183. For more detailed information on proxy advisory ﬁrms, see Stephen Choi et al., The Power of
Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010); Sagiv Edelman, Comment, Proxy
Advisory Firms: A Guide for Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 1369 (2013).
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nance disclosure. Their inﬂuence on vote outcomes is so great that commentators have characterized institutional investors as “outsourcing” their voting to
these ﬁrms.184 Good evidence suggests that a proxy advisory ﬁrm’s recommendation to vote in favor of a shareholder proposal, and thus against the position
of corporate management, can sway the vote by at least 6% and by as much as
20%.185 Thus, a proxy advisory ﬁrm’s recommendation that shareholders vote
in favor of a campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposal can signiﬁcantly move the
vote toward the 50% mark.
In the early 2000s, an inﬂuential proxy advisory service, Institutional
Shareholder Services (“ISS”), opposed shareholder proposals on corporate political spending disclosure as a matter of policy, but then began to support them
on a case-by-case basis.186 In 2012, ISS changed its recommendation to
“[g]enerally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities.”187
This policy change has likely contributed to the growing level of shareholder
voting support for campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposals that do come to a

184.

See generally David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58
J.L. & ECON. 173 (2015).
185. See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, FIN. MGMT. 29, 30 (2002) (ﬁnding that a negative recommendation by ISS was “associated with 13.6% to 20.6% fewer votes cast in favor of management”); Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2404 (2009) (ﬁnding that “a
negative ISS recommendation is associated with 19% fewer votes”); Choi et al., supra note
183, at 906 (“[A]n ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of shareholder votes . . . .”). See
generally David F. Larcker et al., And Then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy
Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/ﬁles/publication-pdf/cgri-closer
-look-31-proxy-ﬁrms-voting-recommendations.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6AX-GP64] (discussing the inﬂuence of proxy advisory ﬁrms on shareholder voting).
186. ISS is widely viewed as the most inﬂuential proxy advisory service in the United States. See,
e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 294-96 (2003) (noting that ISS is inﬂuential because it makes its voting recommendations public and because some pension funds believe
voting in accordance with ISS’s recommendations satisﬁes ERISA requirements).
187. Compare 2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS.
63 (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/ﬁles/ISS2011USPolicySummary
Guidelines20110127.pdf [http://perma.cc/43VR-YV95] (recommending case-by-case voting), with 2012 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS.
64 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/ﬁles/2012USSummaryGuidelines
.pdf [http://perma.cc/WJV3-GHWH] (recommending voting in favor).
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shareholder vote, thus increasing pressure on management to settle.188 In 2013,
the year after ISS’s policy change, 65.9% of shareholders at CF Industries
Holdings, Inc. voted in favor of a political spending disclosure proposal, a high
mark in the voting success of campaign ﬁnance proposals.189
To arrive at recommendations, proxy advisory ﬁrms may engage in private
discussions with the shareholder proponent and with the target company. Importantly, these discussions take place early in the process, typically before the
proxy is published—and thus during the window of settlement negotiation.190
During the settlement window, both investors and target ﬁrms may be lobbying proxy advisory ﬁrms for a recommendation, putting proxy advisory ﬁrms
in a position to effectively approve or disapprove of speciﬁc practices.191 ISS’s
2013 guidance stating that it would consider disclosure of payments to trade associations in its voting recommendations suggests its willingness to endorse
elements of a disclosure standard on the merits and exempliﬁes the trend towards support for proposal settlements.192
188.

189.

190.
191.

192.

Shareholder support for political spending proposals that have gone to a vote rose from an
average of roughly 25% in 2008 to 34% in 2015. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at
10 ﬁg.13.
Dina ElBoghdady, Shareholders Press Companies To Disclose More About Political
Spending, WASH. POST (May 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/shareholders-press-companies-to-disclose-more-about-political-spending/2013/0
5/17/ed1392e4-bf34-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html [http://perma.cc/8TGA-YJTD].
The timing of settlement negotiation was disclosed in interviews conducted with participants acting on behalf of both investors and management.
It is ISS’s explicit policy to recommend a vote against one or more directors of a company
that omits a shareholder proposal from its ballot without no-action relief from the SEC, unless the company has taken “unilateral steps to implement the proposal.” 2015 Benchmark
U.S. Proxy Voting Policies—Frequently Asked Questions on Selected Topics, INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 5 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/policy/2015
faquspoliciesonselectedtopics.pdf [http://perma.cc/PG28-LTBD]. If the company takes
steps to implement the proposal, “the degree to which the proposal is implemented” will
“factor into the assessment” of whether to recommend a vote against the company’s directors. Id. In other words, ISS will approve or disapprove a ﬁrm’s partial implementation of a
shareholder’s proposal, potentially giving them standard-setting authority.
2013 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 65 (Jan. 31,
2013), http://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/ﬁles/2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelines1312013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/658A-VDSU] (qualifying ISS’s general recommendation to vote in favor
of electoral spending disclosure: “However, the following will be considered: The company’s current disclosure of policies and oversight mechanisms related to its direct political
contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes, including information on the types of organizations supported and the
business rationale for supporting these organizations; and [r]ecent signiﬁcant controversies,
ﬁnes, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political
activities”); see Responding to Corporate Political Disclosure Initiatives: A How-To Guide
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ISS’s approach to campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposals has inﬂuenced
deal making in speciﬁc ways. For example, ISS evaluates a ﬁrm’s disclosure
practices in comparison to those of other ﬁrms in the same industry or peer
group.193 At least in theory, this could cause ISS to recommend a vote in favor
of speciﬁc campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards at one company and recommend a vote against the same standards at a different company, depending upon the existing practices of peer ﬁrms. ISS’s evaluation of disclosure practices
on an industry-group-by-industry-group basis has led investors and ﬁrms to
give signiﬁcant weight to the current disclosure practices of other ﬁrms in the
same industry or peer group. As a result, companies in the same industry or
peer group tend to adopt similar disclosure practices, while differences can be
found across industries. The emphasis on industry or peer group practices reﬂects the concerns of ﬁrms that compete with each other, rather than a broader
goal to prevent economy-wide rent-seeking by politicians or to promote electoral transparency. It means that, in practice, campaign ﬁnance transparency is
better in some industries and worse in others.194
2. Settlement Terms
Private ordering of disclosure has formalized the exclusive accountability of
corporate spenders to investors and within that group mainly to a certain type
of investor: the large, institutional fund.195 Institutional investors have framed
their primary motivation for seeking campaign ﬁnance disclosure in economic,
not democratic, terms.196 Likewise, ﬁrm managers negotiate disclosure deals

193.
194.

195.
196.
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for In-House Counsel, COVINGTON & BURLING 4 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.cov
.com/ﬁles/Publication/01943f36-dfd4-4c4b-8cdb-11766b93f29b/Presentation/PublicationAt
tachment/7b101d72-01e6-4745-bc0f-1300d9ac4c05/Responding_to_Corporate_Political_Di
sclosure_Initiatives_A_How_To_%20Guide_for_In_House_Counsel.pdf [http://perma.cc
/LVA7-D2LD] (asserting that ISS’s approval of trade association disclosure “was seen as an
implicit endorsement of one of the key objectives of political spending disclosure activists—
enhancing disclosure of corporate payments to trade associations”).
See Larcker et al., supra note 184, at 179 (observing that “the algorithms used to determine
the peer companies . . . are unique to each proxy advisor”).
For example, the CPA provides an index of performance by company sector in its CPAZicklin Index. See 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 80, at 22. According to the CPA’s analysis for 2014, the sectors with the highest average ratings for disclosure and accountability
were Health Care, Materials, and Telecommunications, while the sectors with the lowest average ratings were Information Technology, Financials, and Consumer Discretionary. Id.
Geltman & Skroback, supra note 101, at 476 (“[T]he ﬁnancial strength of a proponent is important in terms of the seriousness with which public registrants consider the proposals.”).
In interviews, representatives of shareholder proponents consistently reported that electoral
integrity and democratic considerations were secondary, not primary, motivations in their
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with the goal of maximizing the ﬁrm’s interests and not with democratic transparency in mind.197 This means that no one participating in the process is primarily concerned with promoting democratic outcomes.198 Some companies
make it clear in the text of their campaign ﬁnance disclosure reports that voters
are not the intended audience.199 The disclosure standards produced in this
context are thus likely to advance the interests of two sets of elites—corporate
management and institutional investment funds.200
Three aspects of private disclosure standards illustrate this elite bias. Disclosure policies set through proposal settlements favor infrequent reporting of
only very large payments. In addition, they make no distinctions among “dark
money” payments to inﬂuence federal, state, and local elections. In effect, disclosure standards have evolved primarily to promote the mutually beneﬁcial
interests of investors and managers, which include a strong interest in minimizing disclosure costs and a focus on investor materiality.
Annual Reporting. The emerging private disclosure standard requires a
single, annual disclosure of corporate spending for the calendar year. The CPA
promotes semi-annual reporting as a best practice, but the trend in settlements
reviewed for this Article favored less frequent disclosure. Of forty-two investorefforts. This view was also reﬂected in many investor letters to the SEC in support of a
rulemaking petition demanding mandatory political spending disclosure. See infra notes
263-267 and accompanying text; cf. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 654 (“[I]nstitutional investors have economic incentives to engage in activism that derive both from the prospect of
reduced risk and the potential for higher returns.”).
197. For management’s point of view about political spending disclosure, see Matthew Lepore, A
Case for the Status Quo: Voluntary Disclosure, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 413 (2013). Mr. Lepore
was, at the time he wrote the article, the Corporate Secretary and Chief Governance Counsel
of Pﬁzer, Inc.
198. This is consistent with studies of corporate environmental reporting, which have found that
corporate managers view investors—and not community members or the public—as the
primary audience for corporate environmental disclosures. See Crawford Spence, Social and
Environmental Reporting and the Corporate Ego, 18 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 254, 255 (2009)
(reporting that a study of UK companies found that “[i]nvestors and employees were cited
by [corporate reporting managers] as overwhelmingly the most important audiences” for
social and environmental disclosures).
199. For example, Southwestern Energy’s website provides a link to its disclosures with this
statement: “Southwestern Energy Company makes available to its shareholders and stakeholders a list of all corporate political contributions and contributions made by the Company . . . .” SWN’s Political Activities, SW. ENERGY (emphasis added), http://
www.swn.com/corporategovernance/Pages/politicalactions.aspx
[http://perma.cc/8P99
-MZXZ].
200. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 491 (2013) (describing “shareholder politics” as “a contest between two
elite groups: corporate managers and investment intermediaries”).
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ﬁrm agreements, only fourteen committed ﬁrms to report their spending more
frequently than once per year.201
Such infrequent disclosure promotes the mutual interests of corporate
management and shareholders, but it falls short of the pre-election reporting
that the Supreme Court endorsed in Buckley v. Valeo as playing a key informational role for voters.202 Annual disclosure conforms to other corporate reporting cycles, such as the preparation of an annual ﬁnancial statement and an annual Sustainability or Corporate Responsibility Report. Of course, it is less
costly to the ﬁrm to produce a disclosure only once per year. Annual reporting
also ﬁts nicely with the investment analysis practices of institutional investors,
which generally review the companies in their portfolios on an annual cycle.
Yet a single annual report, produced after December 31, is virtually worthless to
a voter seeking information in advance of a November election.
High Payment Thresholds. When it comes to corporate payments to 501(c)
nonproﬁts, companies’ own disclosure policies are potentially important gapﬁllers: no public campaign ﬁnance law requires disclosure of this information.
However, the emerging private disclosure standard requires disclosure only
when “dark money” payments exceed a high dollar-value threshold, most
commonly $50,000.203 Of the investor-ﬁrm agreements studied, only twentynine of the forty-two speciﬁed a reporting threshold for payments to trade associations.204 Of these twenty-nine agreements, twenty used a threshold of
$50,000 or greater.205 Only six ﬁrms agreed to a $25,000 threshold, and a mere
three committed to thresholds below $25,000. This suggests that companies’
disclosure policies largely fail as gap-ﬁllers; many large “dark money” payments are not disclosed under these policies, just as they are not required to be
disclosed by public law. The use of high reporting thresholds also suggests that
investor materiality concepts have inﬂuenced private disclosure standards.206

201.

Thirteen agreements committed ﬁrms to semi-annual disclosure, while one committed a
ﬁrm to quarterly disclosure.
202. 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (describing voters’ informational interest in campaign ﬁnance disclosure for “evaluating those who seek federal office”).
203. See 2014 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 47, at 17 (“Many companies use a threshold amount
(e.g. $25,000 a year) to reduce the burden of reporting and focus on the politically active
trade associations for transparency.”).
204. A number of agreements either did not commit the ﬁrm to disclose payments to 501(c) nonproﬁts at all or did not specify a reporting threshold.
205. One agreement used a $100,000 reporting threshold.
206. See Sarah C. Haan, Voter Primacy, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2685-89 (2015) (discussing
concepts of investor materiality and their implications for disclosure of corporate political
spending after Citizens United). The word “immaterial” was occasionally used to describe a
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It is difficult to estimate the volume of electoral spending that remains in
the dark when companies employ a $50,000 threshold for reporting 501(c)
spending, but the case of Dow Chemical Company provides one example. Dow
Chemical Company’s 2013 public website disclosure reported payments only to
trade associations to which it had contributed $50,000 or more.207 The following year, it lowered its threshold to $25,000.208 When it used the higher
threshold, it reported payments to twenty-ﬁve organizations; when it used the
lower threshold, it reported payments to thirty-ﬁve organizations. It is impossible to know how much spending was not disclosed in the 2013 report that
would have been disclosed using the lower threshold. However, the total value
of payments that Dow reported in 2014 to organizations that did not appear on
its 2013 report, and which did not independently exceed $50,000 (which would
have made them separately reportable under the $50,000 threshold), was
$213,307.209 Citizens—though probably not shareholders—would consider this
amount of political spending to be signiﬁcant.
One-Size-Fits-All Reporting. A signiﬁcant aspect of the emerging private
standards is the use of a one-size-ﬁts-all reporting threshold for “dark money”
company’s political spending in written correspondence between an investor and a company
reviewed for this analysis, suggesting that materiality concepts were inﬂuencing the parties’
positions on what should be disclosed. See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Jan.
11, 2013) (on ﬁle with author).
207. Trade Association Lobbying Expenditures for Both Dow and Dow AgroSciences—
2013, DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/-/media/dow/business-units
/dow-us/pdf/2013-trade-association-lobbying-expenditures.ashx [http://perma.cc/6CLK
-MTAY]. This disclosure appears to have been mandated by a 2009 agreement between
Dow Chemical and its investor, the Mercy Investment Program. However, that agreement,
as memorialized in Mercy Investment Program’s withdrawal letter, called for Dow to disclose all contributions to trade associations without a dollar threshold. This agreement is on
ﬁle with the author.
208. Id. (“For 2013, Dow reported information for trade associations and civic organizations to
which Dow contributed $50,000 or more annually. The threshold was lowered to $25,000
with the 2014 report.”) In 2014, Dow Chemical reached a second disclosure agreement with a
small group of investors. This agreement committed the company to greater transparency,
but, like the 2009 agreement, it did not specify a reporting threshold. Since Dow employed
a lower reporting threshold thereafter, however, we can surmise that the $25,000 threshold
may have been an informal part of the deal. The 2014 agreement is on ﬁle with the author.
209. Trade Association Lobbying Expenditures for Both Dow and Dow AgroSciences – 2014, DOW
CHEMICAL COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/-/media/dow/business-units/dow-us/pdf/2014
-trade-association-lobbying-expenditures.ashx [http://perma.cc/WPY6-HQNC]. This is a
small fraction of the $5,971,202 total trade association spending that Dow reported in 2014
using the lower $25,000 threshold. However, it could represent a signiﬁcant amount of
money in the context of one or two state or local elections or ballot initiatives. Dow’s disclosure did not provide information about the purpose or purposes of the trade association
spending.
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payments intended to inﬂuence federal, state, and local elections. That is, private disclosure law generally commits a corporation to a single disclosure
threshold for payments to 501(c) nonproﬁts that will apply whether the company donates to inﬂuence a local board of education election or to support a
candidate for Congress. In contrast, public election law commonly provides
different reporting thresholds for different types of elections, with higher
thresholds for federal elections because they tend to involve greater overall
spending.210 Under the private law approach, a corporation that has adopted a
$50,000 threshold could donate $49,000 to a 501(c) nonproﬁt to inﬂuence a
local election with no disclosure obligation at all. While a $49,000 expenditure
would not stand out in a federal election, it might be very signiﬁcant in the
context of a municipal campaign.
As a result of the common use of one-size-ﬁts-all thresholds, companies
can have more secret inﬂuence on state and local elections than on federal elections while complying with their “voluntary” disclosure commitments. Over
time, this may lead companies to channel their political spending—and particularly their controversial political spending—away from federal elections and
toward state and local elections and ballot initiatives. This may inﬂuence businesses to try to accomplish through a series of state or local campaigns what
they might otherwise have tried to accomplish through efforts at the federal
level. The one-size-ﬁts-all threshold thus not only reveals a ﬁrm-centered (rather than election-centered) approach to disclosure, but may have signiﬁcant
unintended consequences in terms of channeling corporate political action to
jurisdictions where inﬂuential spending is more easily concealed from voters.
Private disclosure standards are likely to further evolve in some predictable
ways. For example, investors’ general disclosure interests focus on risk and its
relationship to future revenue, while managers are typically concerned with
compliance and cost control. Virginia Harper Ho has summarized the case for
“risk-related” shareholder activism, which promotes the adoption of corporate
systems to identify and manage social and environmental risks and encourages
disclosure.211 The trend toward risk-based disclosure has been observed by
scholars of voluntary corporate environmental reporting.212 As Harper Ho

210.

See Indep. Inst. v. Williams, No. 14-1463, slip op. at 21 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016) (“It is not
surprising . . . that a disclosure threshold for state elections is lower than an otherwise comparable federal threshold. Smaller elections can be inﬂuenced by less expensive communications.”).
211. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 651.
212. Rory Sullivan & Andy Gouldson, Does Voluntary Carbon Reporting Meet Investors’ Needs?, 36
J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 60, 61-62 (2012). See generally Matthew Haigh & Matthew A.
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points out, evidence suggests that effective management of social and environmental risk can improve ﬁrm proﬁtability and ﬁnancial performance,
providing investors with a motive to pursue risk-based disclosure.213 Private
campaign ﬁnance disclosure is thus likely to further evolve (as voluntary environmental reporting has) to address the mutually beneﬁcial interests of corporate managers and investors. Yet voters learn little of value from disclosures tailored to provide information about individual ﬁrms’ risk management related
to political spending.
One danger is that widespread adoption of private disclosure standards
could reduce the public’s appetite for public disclosure reform. If the public believes that corporations have “voluntarily” adopted transparent practices, voters
may willingly allow disclosure standards to be set exclusively through private
ordering.214 The term “voluntary,” which is often applied to disclosure mandated by proposal settlements, implies that ﬁrms are good corporate citizens who
have freely chosen to report their spending out of a sense of civic virtue. In fact,
much of the reporting that is labeled “voluntary” has been forced out of companies through private bargaining and is the product of bargained-for exchange. If the public understood how “voluntary” corporate disclosure came
about, it might be less complacent about the need for public supervision of that
disclosure.
Finally, even if public campaign ﬁnance laws are reformed to require mandatory corporate disclosure, established—and ﬂawed—corporate practices may
be imported into new laws. For example, evidence indicates that “voluntary”
environmental disclosure standards have had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the subsequent development of mandatory standards.215 This is further reason to press
for better participation, transparency, rule content, and enforcement in private
disclosure standard setting.

Shapiro, Carbon Reporting: Does it Matter?, 25 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 105
(2012) (discussing the informational needs of investors related to environmental risk).
213. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 693.
214. Cf. Sitaraman, supra note 157, at 803 (noting that the success of private ordering in electoral
regulation “would bolster an argument that government regulation is unnecessary”).
215. The carbon disclosure movement “has generated considerable momentum toward the formalization of carbon accounting standards, which are crossing over into the regulatory apparatus of agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental
Protection Agency.” Janelle Knox-Hayes & David Levy, The Political Economy of Governance by
Disclosure: Carbon Disclosure and Nonﬁnancial Reporting as Contested Fields of Governance, in
TRANSPARENCY IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 217 (Aarti
Gupta & Michael Mason eds., 2014).
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3. Enforcement
One of the most intriguing questions about shareholder proposal settlement agreements is whether and to what extent they are enforceable against a
company. To date, institutional investors have not sought judicial enforcement
of settlement agreements through civil lawsuits. Instead, to the extent that
shareholder proponents have engaged in enforcement activity at all, they have
done so by renewing or threatening to renew the shareholder proposal at the
next annual meeting.216
Proposal settlements are contracts accompanied by an exchange of consideration and thus should be enforceable in court. However, most agreements reviewed for this Article commit the company to performance for an indeﬁnite
term—an ongoing disclosure obligation with no end. This potentially limits a
court’s ability to enforce the company’s disclosure commitment. Of course,
courts may imply a reasonable term for a party’s performance. One year would
certainly be a reasonable implied term for a disclosure commitment in a proposal settlement, since the investor has made a complimentary one-year commitment: it has given up its one annual opportunity to bring a proposal to a
vote. Because Rule 14a-8 also limits the ability of the investor to submit subsequent proposals—for example, if the company is deemed to have “substantially
implemented” a policy reform, perhaps in a previous settlement—a longer term
might also be reasonable.217 At any rate, a simple change to the agreements to
specify the length of the company’s disclosure commitment would remedy potential enforceability problems.
The fact that investors have not sought to write airtight contracts or to enforce breaches in court suggests several possibilities. First, it is possible that,
even in the absence of legal enforcement mechanisms, shareholder proponents
and management will engage in cooperative settlements they view as mutually
beneﬁcial. This requires shareholders to trust management to fulﬁll its obligations—perhaps in reliance on legally or socially framed obligations of corporate
management to its shareholders, including those, like ﬁduciary duties, that
have unclear application to proposal implementation. Some legal scholars, notably Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, have explored cooperative patterns of be-

216.

In background interviews, several investors stated that they had renewed a proposal or
threatened to renew a proposal as a means to enforce a social or environmental settlement
agreement. The investors were not speaking speciﬁcally of campaign ﬁnance disclosure settlements.
217. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2016) (allowing a company to exclude a shareholder proposal
“[i]f the company has already substantially implemented” it).
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havior within ﬁrms where legal and market forces only weakly constrain behavior.218
A different possibility is that shareholder proponents ascribe greater value
to the achievement of the settlement than they do to the company’s compliance
with the settlement’s terms. The shareholder proponent bears all the costs of
drafting the proposal and negotiating the settlement; when settlement is
achieved, the SRI fund or public pension fund may issue a press release to announce its success in getting some company to adopt a social or environmental
policy. At this point, the investor has achieved a reputational beneﬁt. It has little incentive to take on future costs of monitoring or enforcement. Not only
will the investor likely have to shoulder these costs alone, but the discovery that
a company has violated a settlement agreement arguably diminishes the value
of the settlement and, therefore, the investor’s reputation. In interviews, some
investors stated that they monitored ﬁrms’ compliance with the agreements
but others said they did not monitor them and instead relied on the media and
on the nonproﬁt CPA to report disclosure problems.219 The fact that some
shareholder proponents admitted that they did not monitor the agreemnts
suggests that compliance was not the goal of the deal.
The main tool investors have used to enforce private campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards is the threat to reinitiate the shareholder proposal process.
Because the shareholder proposal process occurs once per year, investors tend
to evaluate companies on an annual basis that conforms to the SEC’s timeline
for ﬁling shareholder proposals. In fact, the CPA’s annual CPA-Zicklin Index of
Corporate Political Spending Disclosure and Accountability, which ranks S&P
500 companies based in part on their disclosure practices, may serve a key
monitoring function for shareholder proponents of campaign ﬁnance disclosure settlements. The CPA-Zicklin Index is published annually in the fall, perfectly (or perhaps coincidentally) timed to provide investor activists with information in advance of proxy season.220
Enforcement of settlement agreements is hobbled by yet a second problem:
Rule 14a-8 imposes eligibility requirements for shareholder proponents that, in
some cases, prevent them from reinitiating proposals. Shareholders considering reinitiation must hold the requisite amount of stock for a year before the

218.

See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
219. Cf. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 652 (“What is undisputed is . . . that most institutional investors do not actively monitor portfolio ﬁrms.”).
220. See, e.g., 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 80.
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future meeting;221 this imposes what amounts to a never-ending requirement
of continuous ownership on shareholders wishing to monitor and enforce their
settlements. A fund that sells the company’s stock after the initial settlement
will be ineligible to reinitiate the proposal if the company stops complying with
the agreement. Meanwhile, other shareholders who meet the eligibility requirements may not be aware of the agreement, are unlikely to have been monitoring the company’s compliance, and will not know that the shareholder proponent has sold its shares. Other shareholders also will not have access to the
settlement agreement unless the original shareholder proponent gave it to
them. The original shareholder proponent may have moved on long ago, however, retaining no interest in the target company’s policies. Thus, the eligibility
requirements of Rule 14a-8 present serious enforcement problems for shareholder proponents who actively manage their investments.
In fact, public companies have failed to honor their disclosure commitments in a signiﬁcant proportion of the campaign ﬁnance settlements reviewed
for this Article. The Article’s analysis focused on forty-two agreements from
2009 to 2015 in which a public company committed to speciﬁc campaign ﬁnance disclosure practices in exchange for the withdrawal of a shareholder proposal. In ten cases, or roughly 24% of settlements, the ﬁrm either never complied with the agreement or had ceased complying with it—by disclosing less
than it had promised to disclose in the agreement—by January 2016. Four of
the ten non-complying companies appear to have simply stopped reporting.222
Three companies published reports that provided less information than they
had committed to report in the settlement agreement. And three of the noncomplying companies had gone through a merger or acquisition since the settlement was ﬁnalized. In each case, following the change in control, the company had removed its archive of disclosure reports from its website and had
ceased making new disclosures.
For example, in 2012, Safeway, Inc., then an S&P 500 company trading on
the New York Stock Exchange, settled a shareholder proposal brought by the
New York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF) on campaign ﬁnance
disclosure.223 In that deal, Safeway, Inc. agreed to make annual campaign ﬁnance disclosures on its public website. In January 2015, Safeway merged with

221.

Rule 14a-8 requires a shareholder to have continuously held the requisite amount of the
company’s securities for at least one year prior to the date the proposal is submitted. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2016).
222. A company was considered to have ceased reporting if, at the time of review, its last semiannual report was more than six months overdue.
223. Documents memorializing this agreement are on ﬁle with the author.
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the Albertsons supermarket chain and went private;224 it subsequently removed
its campaign ﬁnance disclosures from its website and ceased reporting on its
political spending. The acquisition effectively ended Safeway’s campaign ﬁnance disclosure commitment under the settlement agreement.
In January 2015, Valero Energy settled a shareholder proposal brought by
the NYSCRF on campaign ﬁnance disclosure. The agreement committed Valero to publish a semi-annual political contribution report on its website. Valero
initially complied with its commitment by posting a report for the period of July 2014 through December 2014.225 As of mid-February 2016, this was still the
last report Valero had posted on its website. For all intents and purposes it appears to have stopped complying with the agreement.
In February 2014, Peabody Energy reached a campaign ﬁnance disclosure
agreement with the Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement that led to
the withdrawal of the pension fund’s shareholder proposal. As part of this
agreement, Peabody committed to publishing an annual disclosure report on
its website. Indeed, Peabody’s 2014 Corporate and Social Responsibility Report
references “an itemized list of the 2014 Peabody [political] contributions,”
which “can be found under the ‘Corporate Responsibility’ tab on the home
page of PeabodyEnergy.com.”226 However, in October 2015, the most recent
campaign ﬁnance disclosure reports posted on Peabody’s website were for calendar year 2013.227 Between October 2015 and January 2016 (after this author
questioned representatives of both the investor and the company about Peabody’s compliance with the settlement agreement), Peabody posted a disclosure report for calendar year 2014.228 That is, Peabody appears to have initially

224.

225.

226.

227.

228.

See Brent Kendall, FTC Clears Safeway-Albertsons Merger, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2015,
4:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-clears-safeway-albertsons-merger-1422383063
[http://perma.cc/3H2H-MACJ].
See Policy on Political Contributions, Lobbying and Trade Associations, VALERO ENERGY
CORP. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.valero.com/en-us/Documents/VALPAC/Political
%20Contributions%20Disclosures.pdf [http://perma.cc/W96G-C6GQ] (including embedded links to reports).
Advanced Energy: 2014 Corporate and Social Responsibility Report, PEABODY
ENERGY 26, http://mscusppegrs01.blob.core.windows.net/mmﬁles/ﬁles/corpresponsibility
/2014_csrr.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CBH-N8XT].
See Political and Lobbying Activities, PEABODY ENERGY (Oct. 7, 2015), http://web.archive
.org/web/20151007044525/http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/506/Political-and-Lob
bying-Activities [http://perma.cc/EUB5-2ZXT]. A screenshot is also on ﬁle with the author.
Peabody has since removed the 2014 disclosure report from its “Political and Lobbying Activities” webpage, replacing it with a 2015 disclosure report. See Political and Lobbying
Activities, PEABODY ENERGY, http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/506/political-and
-lobbying-activities [http://perma.cc/PDL8-YEWW]. Peabody’s 2014 disclosure report is
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complied with the agreement by posting a 2013 disclosure report and then to
have stopped complying with the agreement until a third party raised questions
in late 2015.
The high rate of settlement failure suggests that investors’ ﬁnancial incentives are a strong force in shaping post-settlement monitoring and enforcement: because the costs of monitoring and enforcement may not be costjustiﬁed for an individual shareholder proponent, investors have engaged in
little monitoring and weak enforcement.
In a few cases, a shareholder proponent has taken a step that may increase
the likelihood of compliance: requesting a notice in the proxy statement that
acknowledges new disclosure practices and connects them to investor activism.
For example, the Boeing Company’s 2013 Proxy Statement, which was ﬁled
with the SEC, provided the following notice to shareholders:
Investor Voice submitted a shareholder proposal for the Annual Meeting requesting that the Board report semi-annually describing Boeing’s
policies, procedures and expenditures related to political contributions
and third-party activities. Boeing considered the proposal and Boeing’s
“Statement on Federal, State and Local Political Expenditures” addressing the proposal can be found at www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt
_ops/pol_expend.html.229
Similarly, in its 2015 Proxy Statement, Cardinal Health included this more
oblique statement: “After considering feedback received from shareholders in
recent years, we have . . . enhanced our disclosure on Board oversight of political contributions, and beginning in calendar year 2016 will post an annual reon ﬁle with the author, who downloaded it from Peabody’s website on January 15, 2016.
Peabody is one of many companies that does not archive past years’ disclosure reports on its
website.
229. Boeing Co., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 65 (Mar. 15, 2013). When the link was visited by the author
on September 22, 2015, it directed the author to a webpage entitled “Political Expenditures”
that did not speciﬁcally reference Investor Voice or Newground Social Investments,
but which provided links to Boeing’s voluntary reports on political spending. Other
companies whose proxy statements have mentioned withdrawn shareholder proposals from
Investor Voice on the subject of campaign ﬁnance disclosure include Starbucks Corp. (2009)
and Cisco Systems, Inc. (2015). See Starbucks Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 13
(Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000095013409000847
/v50962dedef14a.htm [http://perma.cc/VSH8-PL2C]; Cisco Systems, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 4
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858877/000119312515333996
/d95056ddef14a.htm#toc95056_10 [http://perma.cc/M7RP-KE8S].
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port on political contributions on our website.”230 In fact, both companies had
negotiated an agreement with a shareholder that committed it to speciﬁc campaign ﬁnance disclosure practices in exchange for the shareholder’s withdrawal
of a shareholder proposal.231
Most issuers’ proxy statements do not contain such notices. Possibly, proxy
notices are undesirable from the managers’ point of view because they could
create liability. The publication of a materially false or misleading statement in
a proxy statement violates federal securities law. Although it is not established
that a broadly worded statement like those quoted above would satisfy materiality in the absence of a related vote by shareholders, a ﬁrm may be more likely
to comply with an agreement to begin posting an annual campaign ﬁnance disclosure report on its website if it has committed to do so in its proxy statement.
In light of the signiﬁcant barriers to enforcement, corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosures are of questionable quality. Firms can violate their disclosure
commitments with impunity. The literature has long documented qualitative
problems with “voluntary” corporate environmental reporting.232 For example,
230.

Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 11 (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/721371/000072137114000214/cah-2014xdef14a.htm [http://perma.cc/R46P-FS7X].
231. The Boeing Company settled a political spending proposal with Investor Voice on behalf of
Newground Social Investment in or around December 2012. Documents related to this settlement are on ﬁle with the author. The Cardinal Health settlement, negotiated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters between August and November 2015, left almost no
public trace. The Teamsters had brought political spending proposals to a vote at Cardinal
Health in prior years, garnering 41% shareholder approval in 2014 and 40% in 2013. The
Teamsters’ 2015 Shareholder Season Report omits any mention of the 2015 proposal or its
outcome. Compare 2015 Shareholder Season Report, TEAMSTERS, http://teamster.org/2015
-shareholder-season-report [http://perma.cc/D6R5-JJDX] (“Teamster Funds ﬁled shareholder proposals at 19 companies voted on by investors this year on a range of topics.”) with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund/TAPP/GCC 2015 Shareholder Season Report, TEAMSTERS, http://teamster.org/sites/teamster.org/ﬁles/12222015shareholderrpt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6PK9-E9Z8] (listing the voting outcomes for eighteen proposals). See
generally Cardinal Health, Inc., supra note 230 (providing the language quoted in the text
but no proposal); Press Release, Sustainable Invs. Inst., New Analysis: Mixed Results for
2015 Proxy Season on Social & Environmental Issues 3 (Aug. 19, 2015), http://siinstitute.org
/press/2015/Si2_Press_Release_Proxy_Review__Aug__2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/YS8D
-D4XJ] (containing a pending shareholder proposal at Cardinal Health from the Teamsters).
232. See, e.g., Carol A. Adams, The Ethical, Social and Environmental Reporting-Performance Portrayal Gap, 17 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 731, 749 (2004) (identifying “lack of
‘completeness’” as a “particularly concerning feature” of the non-ﬁnancial reporting of a
large, multinational company in an in-depth study); Andrea Liesen et al., Does Stakeholder
Pressure Inﬂuence Corporate GHG Emissions Reporting: Empirical Evidence from Europe, 28
ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1047, 1056 tbl.11 (2015) (ﬁnding that an average of

327

the yale law journal

126:262

2016

studies have shown that companies choose to disclose good environmental data
more often than they choose to disclose bad data, skewing the information in
the aggregate.233
Corporate political spending disclosure has been the subject of less empirical research, but similar concerns have emerged. Studies in both 2011 and 2014
found that many companies that claimed to have policies banning electionrelated spending actually engaged in such activity.234 For example, the 2014
study found that Ford Motor Company made payments to ﬁve 527 organizations between 2011 and 2013, although it had stated in its 2010 and 2011 proxy
statements that it had a policy not to make contributions to political organizations.235 The 2011 study found similar discrepancies by comparing companies’
disclosures to disclosures made by nonproﬁts to the IRS.236

233.

234.

235.
236.
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15% of 431 E.U. companies that voluntarily disclosed greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 to
2009 made complete disclosures).
For example, an empirical analysis found that corporate participants actually increased
greenhouse gas emissions over time while reporting reductions. See Eun-Hee Kim & Thomas P. Lyon, Strategic Environmental Disclosure: Evidence from the DOE’s Voluntary Greenhouse
Gas Registry, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 311, 312 (2011). According to the researchers, the
“sharp disconnect between actual and reported [emissions] suggested that . . . [corporate]
participants took advantage of the program’s loose reporting requirements, selectively reporting on successful projects while remaining silent about any actions that increased emissions.” Id. at 320.
See Heidi Welsh & Robin Young, Corporate Governance of Political Expenditures:
2011 Benchmark Report on S&P 500 Companies, IRRC INST. 26-27 (Nov.
2011), http://www.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Political_Spending_Rep
ort_Nov_10_20111.pdf [http://perma.cc/WAC7-RWJ5] (“Out of the 57 companies . . . that
have policies apparently prohibiting political spending, only 23 companies actually did not
give money to political committees, parties, or candidates.”); The Myth of Corporate
Disclosure Exposed, CITIZENS FOR RESP. ETHICS WASH. (2014) http://www
.citizensforethics.org/page/-/PDFs/Reports/4_15_2014_Myth_of_Corporate_Disclosure_E
xposed_The_Problem_with_Political_Spending_Reports_CREW.pdf
[http://perma.cc
/6QU3-E5SQ].
The Myth of Corporate Disclosure Exposed, supra note 234, at 27.
Welsh & Young, supra note 234. The IRRC Institute 2011 study found, for example, that H.J.
Heinz Company (“Heinz”) made $10,000 in contributions to 527 groups in contravention of
a speciﬁc policy banning donations to 527 groups. Id. Heinz was taken private in June 2013
by an investment consortium that included Berkshire Hathaway, one of the lowest-scoring
companies on the Index. See Press Release, KraftHeinz, Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital
Complete Acquisition of H.J. Heinz Company (June 7, 2013), http://news.heinz.com/press
-release/ﬁnance/berkshire-hathaway-and-3g-capital-complete-acquisition-hj-heinz-comp
any [http://perma.cc/72JR-K8S7]. Once private, Heinz removed all of its political spending
disclosures from its website; as a result, the company’s spending in election year 2012 was
never disclosed.
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Similarly, in 2012, Aetna revealed—accidentally—in a ﬁling to the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) that in 2011 it had made previously undisclosed payments totaling $3.3 million to a politically active
501(c)(4) nonproﬁt, the American Action Network.237 That year, Aetna had declined to disclose (c)(4) payments in its voluntary corporate disclosure; it later
revised the NAIC ﬁling to remove the payment. Aetna’s CEO took the position
that disclosure of the money was not required because it was spent on “educational activities.”238 Aetna’s potentially misleading disclosures led a shareholder
to ﬁle a securities fraud lawsuit against the company in 2013, and the complaint
in the case details serious discrepancies between the voluntary disclosure reports that Aetna published on its website and information provided to the IRS
by nonproﬁts that claimed to have received payments from Aetna.239 These
documented problems with disclosures by Ford Motor Company, Aetna, and
other ﬁrms suggest that “voluntary” disclosures may not be worthy of public
trust.
4. Citizen Sovereignty
Private disclosure law undercuts citizen sovereignty in the regulation of the
political process itself, thereby potentially delegitimizing disclosure as a tool to
promote electoral integrity. Privatizing campaign ﬁnance disclosure law completely cuts citizens out of the disclosure rulemaking process as stakeholders,
relegating them to a subordinate role in their own self-government. It also
shifts a measure of election oversight to the SEC, removing campaign ﬁnance
from the domain of election experts and judges and placing it within the authority of regulators whose prime objective is the protection of investors.

237.

The 2013 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Accountability and Disclosure, CTR. FOR POL.
ACCOUNTABILITY 30 n.28 (Sept 24, 2013), http://www.iccr.org/sites/default/ﬁles/resources
_attachments/2013%20CPA-Zicklin%20Index%20Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/CY56-HFJC];
Press Release, Ctr. for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., Aetna Hides $7 Million in Political
Spending; CREW Calls for Greater Disclosure (June 14, 2012), http://secure
.citizensforethics.org/press/entry/aetna-political-spending-american-action-network
-chamber-of-commerce [http://perma.cc/5K3N-QKYH].
238. See Letter from Mark T. Bertolini, Chairman, CEO & President, Aetna, to Melanie Sloan,
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. (June 14, 2012), http://s3.amazonaws
.com/storage.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20022528/6-14-12_Aetna
_Letter_to_CREW_Mark_T_Bertolini_Response.pdf [http://perma.cc/2XS6-J8MJ].
239. See Complaint ¶¶ 27-29, Silberstein v. Aetna, Inc., 2014 WL 1388790 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2014)
(No. 13 CV 8759).
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In fact, because the Constitution speciﬁcally grants Congress the power to
regulate federal elections,240 the privatization of election law potentially upsets
the Constitution’s thoughtful delegation of regulatory authority. When the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United removed a whole domain of electoral
spending—corporate independent expenditures—from substantive regulation
by the state, it shifted disclosure regulation closer to the core of Congress’s remaining authority to regulate elections.241 In light of the Founders’ express
grant of power to Congress to regulate federal elections and the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of and reliance on disclosure as central to that power, the
privatization of disclosure law compromises vital design elements of our political process. Congress’s failure to reform campaign ﬁnance disclosure in the face
of strong citizen demand for reform242 has created a regulatory vacuum for private actors to ﬁll, altering not only the source of disclosure law for corporations, but also the identities and allegiances of the institutions that shape electoral processes and outcomes. A key danger is that privatizing disclosure
regulation may erode public conﬁdence in the free-functioning of the electoral
process.243 In short, privatized election law is a remarkably undemocratic way
to promote electoral transparency.244
240.

241.

242.

243.

244.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.”); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (“The constitutional power of
Congress to regulate federal elections is well established . . . . ”); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 310 (1941).
See Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualiﬁed Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in
the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 559 (2011) (“[D]isclosure laws remain one of the few remaining constitutional levers to further the public interest through campaign ﬁnance law.”).
A New York Times/CBS News poll in May 2015 found that 75% of respondents believed that
outside spending groups should be required to publicly disclose their contributors, a reform
that would reveal the corporate political spending that is currently undisclosed. See Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html [http://perma.cc/ZH6X
-DWRL].
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (“[I]n
Buckley v. Valeo, we speciﬁcally affirmed the importance of preventing . . . the eroding of
public conﬁdence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.” (citation
omitted)); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (affirming the state’s
interest in “[p]reservation of the individual citizen’s conﬁdence in government”); see also
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995) (“Required disclosures about
the level of ﬁnancial support a candidate has received from various sources are supported by
an interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption.”).
This Article has not analyzed the small number of instances in which an activist investor has
used the settlement of civil shareholder litigation to reform corporations’ campaign ﬁnance

shareholder proposal settlements

Proposal settlements are an example of how securities regulation takes on a
“quasi-constitutional dimension” when the subject of the settlement has a
strong constitutional ﬂavor, as electoral regulation does.245 The reform of corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure through proposal settlements suggests that
securities regulation may be ill-ﬁtted for such a quasi-constitutional purpose.
This is due to two main factors. First, securities regulation has evolved over
decades to serve other goals and thus lacks the attributes we would seek in a
regulatory regime serving constitutional ends. There is no reason to believe
that the shareholder proposal mechanism, designed to facilitate shareholder
voice for corporate governance purposes, will serve as an effective mechanism
for generating disclosure law that promotes electoral integrity. Second, the
goals of securities regulation, such as efficient capital formation, are important
in their own right. These aims would be vulnerable to dilution or compromise
if securities regulation morphed into a tool of campaign ﬁnance disclosure reform.
As Elizabeth Pollman has argued, the Supreme Court errs when it relies on
corporate private ordering mechanisms to protect values and goals that are
constitutional or quasi-constitutional in nature.246 Pollman points out, for example, that corporate law focuses on shareholders’ and managers’ interests to
the exclusion of the interests of other corporate stakeholders. Corporate law’s
blinkered focus highlights the misﬁt between corporate law doctrine and the
constitutional or quasi-constitutional work the Supreme Court seems to want
disclosure policy. However, such cases suffer from the same transparency problems that
plague proposal settlements. In 2013, the NYSCRF sued Qualcomm, Inc. in Delaware Chancery Court after the company failed to comply with the investor’s books-and-records request
under Section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law. See Complaint ¶¶ 8-11, N.Y. St.
Common Ret. Fund v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2013 WL 28623 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2013) (No. 8710).
Qualcomm quickly settled the suit by agreeing to new disclosure practices, which were reportedly memorialized in the settlement agreement. See Dan Strumpf, Qualcomm Settles Disclosure Suit with New York, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424127887323549204578320500077425818 [http://perma.cc/BUN9-G8YB]; Press
Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, Qualcomm Implements Industry-Leading Political Spending Disclosure Policy; DiNapoli Commends Action (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb13/022213.htm [http://perma.cc/7CYR-P7KG]. Also
in 2013, News Corp. settled a derivative lawsuit brought by shareholders in the wake of the
British phone hacking scandal; the settlement agreement set campaign ﬁnance disclosure
policies for the company. See Ning Chiu, A Range of Support for Shareholder Proposals on Political Contributions, DAVIS POLK: BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (May 2, 2013), http://www
.brieﬁnggovernance.com/2013/05/a-range-of-support-for-shareholder-proposals-on-politic
al-contributions [http://perma.cc/G494-75GE].
245. Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 4) (on ﬁle with author).
246. See id. (manuscript at 4, 28).
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corporate law to perform.247 This insight also applies to proposal settlements
that set corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure standards because the focus of
Rule 14a-8 on shareholders’ and managers’ binary interests disenfranchises
nearly everyone else from setting disclosure standards.
iv. the future of corporate campaign finance disclosure
The future of corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure may rely heavily on
private ordering. This Article has explored the strengths and weaknesses of
achieving disclosure reform through shareholder proposal settlements, the
main tool of investor activists under our existing securities regulatory regime.
Disclosure reforms wrought through settlement may have partially ﬁlled some
gaps in public disclosure law, but the reforms have primarily advanced the mutually beneﬁcial interests of corporate shareholders and managers. In doing so,
they have defeated important citizen interests, such as pre-election disclosure.
Settlements also raise thorny questions about the role of shareholders in inﬂuencing corporate social and environmental policy, about agency costs, and
about agency capitalism.
Two points are worth underscoring. First, the emergence of “voluntary”
corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure does not mean that public companies are
volunteering to reveal information about the money they spend to inﬂuence
elections. Citizens must understand this point to make sense of corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure data, and to exercise citizen sovereignty over the electoral process. One goal of this Article has been to pull back the curtain on “voluntary” corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure to reveal it as the product of a
bargained-for exchange between shareholders and managers. Another has been
to identify parties with outsized inﬂuence on reform outcomes, such as forproﬁt proxy advisory ﬁrms, and parties excluded from participation altogether,
such as citizens and most corporate stakeholders.
Secondly, shareholder proposals and proposal settlements play out entirely
in the shadow of federal securities regulation. The SEC is indirectly regulating
the reform of corporate political spending disclosure through Rule 14a-8, and
its regulations and no-action guidance are inﬂuencing the substance, format,
and timing of real-world disclosure standards. This year, the public went to the
polls to elect federal and state officials with little information about public
companies’ spending to inﬂuence their votes. This information deﬁcit was
traceable not only to gaps in public disclosure law, but also to private disclosure

247.
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Id. (manuscript at 4, 28-29).
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rules that institutional investors and corporate managers have established
through a settlement mechanism shaped in all material respects by SEC rules.
One solution might be to completely proscribe the settlement of shareholder proposals. This might be done, for example, with a simple rule prohibiting
withdrawal of a proposal. Under such a rule, a company that received a qualifying proposal would have to publish it in the proxy and allow a shareholder
vote. If the company was persuaded to support the proposal, it could simply
publish a statement in support of the proposal in the proxy and ask shareholders to approve it.
This Article does not propose such a rule because shareholders and managers would likely ﬁnd a way to circumvent a prohibition on withdrawal.248 Also,
a rule prohibiting settlement might have the undesirable collateral effect of cutting off quick and cost-effective resolutions of uncontroversial policy reforms. In
an era of agency capitalism, small investors’ channels of informal activism may
be limited, causing them to rely more heavily on the shareholder proposal
mechanism to get the attention of corporate managers.
This Part argues that rather than prohibiting settlement of proposals in
every situation, private actors and the SEC should ﬁx transparency and enforcement problems that characterize existing settlement practices. Settlement
transparency could be improved tomorrow if investors and ﬁrms chose to
adopt transparent practices. Federal securities regulation can be amended to
meaningfully enhance both transparency and enforceability of investor-ﬁrm
settlements. This Part describes a range of private practices and regulatory reforms that can improve the use of the proposal settlement to make social and
environmental change at public companies.
Regardless of the adoption of these reforms, this Part contends that corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure presents an urgent case for public law reform.
The privatization of campaign ﬁnance disclosure is a uniquely undemocratic
way to regulate the democratic process. Here, the method of privatization virtually ensures that certain parties’ interests will be advanced, while citizen interests are defeated. This Part offers a set of factors for law- and policymakers
to use to determine when the scope of a social or environmental shareholder
activism campaign exceeds what we should reasonably expect from private ordering. Campaign ﬁnance disclosure satisﬁes all of these factors, suggesting not

248.

For example, the SEC’s rules require that the shareholder proponent appear at the annual
meeting to present the proposal for a vote; if the proponent fails to appear, the vote may be
canceled. This and other procedural requirements provide opportunities for investors and
managers to comply with the letter of a prohibition on withdrawal while still achieving a de
facto settlement.
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only that the time is ripe for Congress or a federal agency to act, but that inaction by public institutions may have serious consequences.
Scholars, policymakers, and commentators all tend to frame the issue of an
SEC political spending disclosure mandate in simple terms: should the SEC
get involved in regulating campaign ﬁnance disclosure? Many have answered in
the affirmative.
One of the key insights of this Article, however, is that this frame is misleading. The SEC is already involved in regulating how corporate electoral expenditures get disclosed to the public. In fact, SEC rules and no-action guidance have governed the most signiﬁcant reform of corporate campaign ﬁnance
disclosure since the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 were
passed.249 Investors’ efforts to use private ordering to reform disclosure should
not surprise us; private regulation of corporate political speech and disclosure
was endorsed by a ﬁve-Justice majority in Citizens United.250 But if SEC rules
determine everything from who participates in disclosure standard setting to
the number of words in disclosure policies that shareholders can approve, we
should not pretend that the SEC has remained above the fray. This Part encourages a more nuanced discussion about the role of the SEC in governing
private reform of corporate social and environmental policy, given that it is doing this already, and particularly a more honest discussion about how SEC
rules and policies have inﬂuenced what campaign ﬁnance information is available to voters.
A. Reforming Mechanisms of Private Ordering
1. Increasing Transparency and Enforceability of Settlement Agreements
The private actors who make, monitor, and enforce proposal settlements
can and should use private ordering to enhance transparency and enforceability
of settlements. In addition, a number of corporate law and securities regulation
reforms could address problems of democratic transparency, participation, and
enforcement, as well as agency costs, when proposal settlements are used to set
corporate social and environmental policies.

249.

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
250. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010) (rejecting the
“shareholder-protection interest” in reliance on “the procedures of corporate democracy”);
id. at 370 (discussing “[s]hareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate
democracy” in support of disclosure).
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Private Solutions to Transparency Problems. Put simply, investor activists
and corporations can address transparency problems by choosing to make proposal settlements more transparent. Investors could do this, as some already
have, by posting proposals and settlements on the internet and by publicly reporting the dispositions of proposals. Firms could increase transparency by doing the same thing or by publishing information about proposals and settlements in the proxy statement. Firms could also adopt bylaws to govern their
settlement practices and related transparency issues.
Securities Regulation Reforms To Address Transparency Problems. Legal
reform could either make investor-ﬁrm settlement agreements fully transparent
or merely increase transparency of the existence of settlement activity (without
requiring the public ﬁling of agreement documents themselves). For example,
Regulation SK, which requires a ﬁrm to attach all “material” contracts as exhibits to its quarterly and annual reports, could be interpreted to require companies to publicly ﬁle agreements that settle shareholder proposals.251 Alternatively, the SEC could amend its proxy rules to require a company to list in the
proxy statement for the annual meeting all qualifying shareholder proposals it
has received, along with information about their dispositions.
Separately, the SEC could require a company to ﬁle a Form 8-K when it
reaches an agreement with an investor that commits the company to particular
action in consideration for the investor’s withdrawal of a shareholder proposal.252 Requiring a ﬁrm to ﬁle a Form 8-K, thereby revealing an otherwise
secret agreement, would inform the ﬁrm’s other shareholders, the market, and
the public that private ordering has occurred. This would improve allocative
efficiency and provide information to interested third parties. An 8-K could reveal the speciﬁc conduct, standards, and/or reporting obligations that the ﬁrm

251.

See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(a)(4) (2016) (“If a material contract . . . is executed or becomes
effective during the reporting period reﬂected by a Form 10-Q or Form 10-K, it shall be ﬁled
as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q or Form 10-K ﬁled for the corresponding period.”).
252. The SEC could treat such an agreement as a “material deﬁnitive agreement” under Item 1.01
of the Rule, or it could separately designate such agreements as triggering events. The SEC’s
rules require a Form 8-K triggered by a “material deﬁnitive agreement” to be ﬁled within
four business days of the execution of the contract. This short timeframe would add to the
pressure on ﬁrms dealing with multiple shareholder proposals and other concerns in the
lead-up to ﬁnalizing the proxy statement, and it could probably be relaxed. The SEC last increased the number of events that trigger a Form 8-K in 2004. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 (Mar. 25, 2004)
(codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249).
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has adopted, reducing the likelihood of opportunistic settlements.253 Bringing
the practice into the light may encourage shareholders with means—and other
corporate stakeholders with management’s ear—to demand a seat at the negotiating table. It would not, however, provide a right of participation to those
outside the ﬁrm.254
Private Solutions to Enforcement Problems. There are few enforcement
solutions for investors and ﬁrms to adopt, but shareholder activists would do
well to treat settlement agreements as enforceable contracts—by, for example,
specifying a reasonable duration for a company’s policy commitment—and to
enforce them in court if the company breaches the agreement. However, shareholder activists lack ﬁnancial incentives to enforce agreements in many circumstances.
Securities Regulation and State Law Reforms to Address Enforcement
Problems. To address the serious enforceability problems that plague settlement agreements, state courts or legislatures could clarify that a corporation’s
board of directors or officers violate their duty of loyalty when they cease complying with a settlement agreement that served as consideration for an investor’s decision to withdraw a shareholder proposal. In such a case, management
has essentially cheated the shareholder proponent out of a statutory right and
disenfranchised other shareholders by preventing a vote on the proposal.255
Clariﬁcation that the board’s ﬁduciary duties require it to honor settlement
agreements would improve the quality of corporate campaign ﬁnance reporting, increase the value of settlements, reduce monitoring costs on investor activists, and foster trust between shareholders and managers.
In addition, the SEC could amend Rule 14a-8 to suspend the continuousownership requirement of subsection (b). This amendment would allow a
shareholder to reinitiate a proposal that it had previously withdrawn in reliance

253.

Because this is true, if the SEC were to treat investor-ﬁrm agreements as triggering events
for Form 8-K, it should not routinely afford conﬁdential treatment to investor-ﬁrm agreements on CSR subjects.
254. One consequence of treating an investor-ﬁrm agreement on campaign ﬁnance disclosure as a
triggering event for Form 8-K is that termination of the agreement may also require a Form
8-K ﬁling, thus signaling to the shareholder proponent and to the public that the company
has ceased complying with its disclosure obligations under the agreement. Item 8.01 allows
a ﬁrm to ﬁle a Form 8-K for events that do not otherwise trigger a ﬁling but which the ﬁrm’s
management believes would be important to its shareholders. The author is aware of no
ﬁrm that has ﬁled a Form 8-K under Item 8.01 to disclose a campaign ﬁnance disclosure
agreement with an investor.
255. Cf. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (noting that courts will police votebuying agreements for evidence of a purpose to “defraud” or “disenfranchise the other
stockholders”).
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on the company’s commitment to take certain action, if the company failed to
comply with its commitment. Thus actively managed funds could enforce their
agreements with ﬁrms, even if they had sold and repurchased the company’s
stock in the year preceding the next shareholder meeting.
Alternatively, the SEC could change Rule 14a-8 to allow any shareholder to
renew a proposal that was settled on the ground that the company failed to
honor the settlement.
2. Objections to Increasing Transparency and Enforcement
It is likely that enhanced transparency and enforcement of settlements will
discourage parties from settling. From corporate management’s point of view,
if it cannot negotiate a proposal away in secret, it may be better off opposing
the proposal at the annual shareholder’s meeting. From the shareholder proponent’s point of view, it may prefer to resist settling for watered-down social and
environmental policies if it knows the settlement will be subject to public scrutiny. Transparency and enforcement reforms will increase the costs of settlement, imposing costs on ﬁrms and changing the cost-beneﬁt analysis for corporate management considering a policy reform.
Socially responsible investors may therefore oppose greater transparency
and enforcement of settlements on the ground that these changes would reduce
the ability of shareholder activists to succeed in achieving socially beneﬁcial reforms. However, this shift may not be a great loss.
First, this Article has shown that in the case study of campaign ﬁnance disclosure, policies adopted through proposal settlements have improved corporate transparency in some respects, but have not succeeded in making corporate
electoral spending transparent to voters in advance of elections. Thus, privately
negotiated disclosure law may not be as socially beneﬁcial as its proponents
contend. We should not simply assume that institutional investors and corporate managers have the ability to reach socially beneﬁcial outcomes. Investors
have bargained away important features of electoral disclosure, such as low reporting thresholds and pre-election reporting. Moreover, the emergence of
shareholder proposals opposed to corporate social responsibility suggests that
secret proposal settlements may not always advance progressive causes.
Second, the shareholder vote may be superior to settlement as a mechanism
for advancing activists’ goals. Greater participation by a range of shareholders
makes it more likely that corporate policy reforms will reﬂect a range of interests. Public scrutiny will make it difficult for participants to bargain away policies that most shareholders favor, and it will ensure that policy reforms, when
they are achieved, are reﬂected in stock prices.
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Enhancing transparency and enforcement of settlements will tend to increase the proportion of social and environmental proposals that go to a vote,
potentially turning the end of a company’s annual shareholder meeting into a
referendum on its social and environmental policies. Admittedly, voting imposes costs on the company. However, the process would remain shareholderdriven, meaning that shareholders themselves will decide what subjects to raise
in proposals, and shareholder interest will determine how much time at the
annual meeting will be spent on a social or environmental issue. Rule 14a-8’s
“3% rule”—prohibiting a shareholder proposal from renewal within three years
if it was proposed once within the previous ﬁve years and failed to garner at
least 3% shareholder approval—will ﬁlter out fringe proposals.256 Transparent
processes with full shareholder participation may reduce agency costs, opportunism, and information asymmetries that threaten shareholder interests under
current settlement practices.
Recent history shows us that proposals can win at full votes. The increasing
number of socially conscious investors and the growing effectiveness of nonproﬁt organizations, such as the CPA, that coordinate institutional investor activists and reduce the costs of their activism, reveal that social and environmental activism can succeed through shareholder voting. It is no longer unheard-of
for social and environmental proposals to win majority shareholder support at
the annual meeting, as evidenced by the four proposals on campaign ﬁnance
disclosure that succeeded in 2013 and 2014.257
B. The Case for Public Law Reform: Rulemaking on Corporate Campaign
Finance Disclosure
Transparency and enforcement solutions are a starting point, but in some
cases they may not go far enough to produce corporate policy reforms that are
optimally socially beneﬁcial. Corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure is in this
category, and it presents an urgent case for public law reform. Three factors
suggest this is true. First, the subject of the social policy reform—electoral
transparency—is uniquely signiﬁcant to the public interest. Second, shareholder interests and citizen interests in electoral transparency substantially diverge,
such that excluding citizen interests from the private regulatory regime subordinates citizen interests in important and demonstrable ways. Third, signiﬁ-

256.
257.
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cant shareholder activism on campaign ﬁnance disclosure signals popular support for a public law solution, as well as the potential for private ordering to
move swiftly down a path that confuses voters and obscures spending.
This Section focuses on corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure, but its
analysis is relevant to other corporate social and environmental policy issues. If
all three factors are satisﬁed for a particular social policy reform, it is likely that
Rule 14a-8 and the SEC’s no-action guidance will have begun to shape the substance of policy reforms in a way that subordinates important third-party interests to the interests of shareholders and managers. In that case, the SEC will
already be regulating reform of an important corporate policy, but through a set
of rules designed for other purposes. Law- and policymakers should recognize
that, at this point, the social policy issue is ripe to be addressed by public law.
This Article has argued that, among subjects addressed at the corporate level by shareholder activists, electoral transparency involves uniquely signiﬁcant
public interests. The Constitution itself commits federal electoral regulation to
public, not private, actors, and the Supreme Court has long recognized a critical role for campaign ﬁnance disclosure in promoting electoral integrity. Citizens United increased the stakes by moving disclosure regulation closer to the
core of Congress’s authority to regulate federal elections and by increasing the
money spent by companies to inﬂuence elections. The very concept of citizen
sovereignty would seem to foreclose our dependence on private electoral regulation to solve major campaign ﬁnance problems. Public polls consistently reveal great public interest in campaign ﬁnance and great support for electoral
transparency. Gaps in the transparency of private disclosure law may substantively affect the behavior of corporate spenders by channeling corporate treasury dollars toward state and local elections.
Citizen interests in corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure boil down to voters’ informational needs in advance of elections, combined with their interest in
deterring and detecting corruption and in deterring circumvention of spending
limits. The emerging private law compromises those interests while serving investors’ and managers’ interests in risk management, compliance, and cost
control. The focus on annual reporting of expenditures after elections, and on
only very large expenditures to dark money organizations, suggest that citizens
cannot count on institutional investors to promote disclosure reforms that
meaningfully advance citizen interests. Shareholder proposal settlements will
never facilitate broad participation of corporate stakeholders or the public. The
process is hardwired to produce disclosures that skew against citizen interests.
The groundswell of shareholder activism on campaign ﬁnance disclosure
has reﬂected popular support for disclosure reform, but it has channeled reform through a securities law mechanism that lacks the procedural safeguards
necessary to promote First Amendment values. This is a problem if the public

339

the yale law journal

126:262

2016

must rely only upon this type of disclosure to reveal how public companies ﬁnance elections.
The SEC’s key role in policing corporate social policy reform through the
proposal mechanism suggests that the SEC may be the logical source of a public disclosure mandate. In August 2011, a committee of ten law professors submitted a rulemaking petition asking the SEC to mandate disclosure of corporate political spending.258 In a law review article elaborating on the petition,
Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson argued that shareholders’ interest in political spending information had reached a tipping point that made it appropriate
for the SEC to issue a disclosure mandate.259 The rulemaking petition went on
to garner more supportive comments on the SEC’s website than any other
rulemaking petition in the agency’s history.260 After initially signaling that it
might promulgate a political spending rule,261 the SEC reversed course and
dropped the issue from its regulatory agenda.262 The petition has been renewed
several times since 2011 with no action by the Commission.263
The SEC’s resistance to a political spending disclosure rule is rooted in the
idea that the whole subject falls outside the proper province of securities regulation and the SEC.264 In 2013, a Wall Street Journal editorial described SEC

258.

See Letter from Comm. on Disclosure of Corp. Political Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011
/petn4-637.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ZRF-NZJG].
259. Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 4.
260. See Yin Wilczek, SEC Nominees Should Support Political Spending Transparency, Groups
Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 12, 2015), http://www.bna.com/sec-nominees-support
-n17179927912 [http://perma.cc/S2VV-JBW7] (reporting the number of comments as 1.2
million).
261. See Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC To Propose Rules on
Corporate Political Spending by April 2013, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG., http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/01/09/sec-to-propose-rules-on-corporate
-political-spending-by-april-2013 [http://perma.cc/LM8S-6Q4H].
262. The matter was removed from the SEC’s regulatory agenda in November 2013. See U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Disclosure Regarding the Use of Corporate Resources for Political Activities,
(2012)
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId
REGINFO.GOV
=201210&RIN=3235-AL36 [http://perma.cc/75GQ-9FV9].
263. See Letter from 44 U.S. Senators to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/20150831_SECLetter
.pdf [http://perma.cc/7FZA-XPLR]; Letter from 58 Members of Congress to Mary Jo
White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 22, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/10262015-house-of-representatives-letter-support-petition-4
-637.pdf [http://perma.cc/N5KU-7C4H].
264. The transcript of an SEC meeting on August 5, 2015 addressing this issue reveals some of the
concerns behind the SEC’s resistance. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
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pushback against the proposed rule and reported the SEC staff ’s view that “it’s
not their job to regulate political speech.”265 These and other sources suggest
that individuals within the SEC believe the agency should not stray into new
territory by regulating political-spending disclosure.
In fact, however, this Article has shown that the SEC’s existing rules already
provide the governing framework within which the private ordering of corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure plays out. The SEC is indirectly regulating
disclosure reform. This point has been lost in the debate over the proposed
SEC disclosure mandate.
The private disclosure regime has been heavily shaped by the legal framework of Rule 14a-8 and the SEC’s no-action guidance. What is more, existing
SEC regulation incentivizes settlement of shareholder proposals, requires virtually no transparency, and hobbles enforcement of the resulting disclosure
commitments. Under Rule 14a-8, participation in standard setting is severely
limited, standards mainly serve the interests of participants, and corporate
management ignores its own disclosure commitments. This results in increased
agency costs for ﬁrms, the loss of shareholder prerogatives, and the subversion
of the justiﬁcations for the shareholder proposal mechanism. Another result is
suboptimal social policy reforms that are fragile and, at many companies,
short-lived. In sum, the SEC is regulating the disclosure reform process now,
and it is doing the job badly.
Firm-by-ﬁrm private ordering is not an efficient way to establish disclosure
policies at hundreds of public companies—particularly because disclosure policies are most beneﬁcial, even for investors, when they are consistent and widely
adopted. A public disclosure mandate that applies to all public companies
would cost less than efforts to achieve the same outcome through settlements
at hundreds of companies. In private ordering, the costs of negotiating campaign ﬁnance disclosure policies again and again, ﬁrm by ﬁrm, are largely
borne by institutional investors and by the companies. A public disclosure

Comm’n, Dissenting Statement at an Open Meeting To Adopt the “Pay Ratio” Rule (Aug.
5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-to
-adopt-the-pay-ratio-rule.html [http://perma.cc/BPU9-A8PT] (describing the CEO Pay
Ratio Rule as “a nakedly political rule that hijacks the SEC’s disclosure regime to once again
affect social change desired by ideologues and special interest groups”); Michael S. Piwowar,
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio
Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at
-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html [http://perma.cc/TJ9P-46PY] (“What will
come next? Perhaps it will be political spending disclosure.”).
265. The Other Targeting Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2013, 7:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424127887324783204578624014097139822 [http://perma.cc/6V6Y-6677].
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mandate would not only lower the overall costs of disclosure reform, but it
would also spread the costs more fairly across the beneﬁciaries of disclosure.
Of course, a move by the SEC to address the inﬂuence of its existing regulatory framework on campaign ﬁnance disclosure would ﬁt squarely within the
SEC’s congressional mandate to regulate in the public interest.266 Many scholars have written about the public interest mandate and have criticized the SEC’s
reluctance to put it into action.267 Here, the SEC’s failure to mandate corporate
political spending disclosure, coupled with its failure to mandate transparency
of proposal settlements, amounts to something other than inaction: these failures are regulatory design choices that keep the public and corporate stakeholders in the dark about pressing issues of campaign ﬁnance and corporate
self-regulation.
conclusion
Private ordering has become a shadow front in the battle to regulate American elections. It is reshaping corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure, the means
through which American voters learn about sources of candidate funding and
the inﬂuence of corporations on the political process. This Article has explored
the settlement of the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal as a mechanism to reform corporate social and environmental practices, focusing on corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure as an important and timely case study.
Proposal settlements have produced new campaign ﬁnance disclosure rules
at a signiﬁcant and growing number of S&P 500 companies. The resulting disclosures are not “voluntary,” as they are often mislabeled. Instead, they are the
product of a bargained-for exchange between institutional investors and corporate managers. The new disclosure standards are memorialized in mostly secret
agreements that are not transparent to other corporate stakeholders, capital
markets, or voters. Through an analysis of forty-two settlement agreements
reached between 2009 and 2015, this Article has documented how the emerging
private disclosure standards make limited improvements on public disclosure
law. However, the analysis also revealed that the new standards defeat citizen
interests in pre-election disclosure, employ sky-high reporting thresholds, and
may channel corporate spending away from federal elections to state and local
elections. This is because proposal settlements produce private rules that ad266.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (authorizing the SEC to require
proxy disclosure “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors”).
267. See, e.g., Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50,
58 (1977); Williams, supra note 40, at 1235-37.
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vance the mutually beneﬁcial interests of parties that negotiate the rules: institutional investors and corporate managers.
Even if the private settlements were producing meaningful corporate disclosures, they have proved fragile. They are sometimes nulliﬁed with no public
notice following a change in shareholding or a merger. Companies have often
failed to comply with their commitments in these private deals, likely because
investors have weak economic incentives to monitor and enforce settlements,
and because Rule 14a-8 itself creates challenges for enforcement.
The widespread use of proposal settlements to set corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure policies raises questions of democratic process, given the signiﬁcant citizen interests at stake in electoral regulation. Important parties—
citizens and most shareholders—are excluded from private rulemaking, while
other parties, including for-proﬁt shareholder advisory services, wield outsized
inﬂuence. The role of institutional investors in submitting and settling campaign ﬁnance disclosure proposals raises questions of intermediation in agency
capitalism: most fund beneﬁciaries probably know little about the transparency
deals negotiated on their behalf by fund managers.
Shareholder proposal settlements are also concerning from a corporate
governance point of view. Settlements undercut the economic and noneconomic justiﬁcations for the shareholder proposal itself and potentially impose agency costs on public companies. The agency costs are not outweighed by beneﬁts
to the company, whose management would otherwise have opposed the policy
change. And they are not outweighed by beneﬁts to society in general, since the
private rules settlements produce only weakly advance citizen interests.
Changes to federal securities regulation would enhance the transparency
and enforceability of proposal settlements, and would likely discourage settlement. This Article has recommended a range of potential reforms. They would
not cure all the problems attributable to proposal settlements, but they are potential steps in the right direction.
Corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure presents a uniquely strong case for
public law reform, not only for the reasons highlighted by other legal scholars,
but also for new reasons set out in this Article. The Article has highlighted
three factors that suggest when a social or environmental policy reform may be
poorly suited for private ordering through the proposal settlement mechanism.
These are: (1) when the subject of shareholder activism is uniquely signiﬁcant
to the public interest, (2) when shareholder interests and citizen interests in the
subject substantially diverge, and (3) when a groundswell of shareholder activism signals the potential for private ordering to impose a solution powerfully
motivated by shareholder interests. These three factors are certainly satisﬁed
for campaign ﬁnance disclosure.
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Finally, one of the key insights of this Article is that the SEC is already regulating the reform of corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure, albeit indirectly,
through Rule 14a-8 and its no-action guidance. To date, the SEC has resisted
calls to mandate corporate campaign ﬁnance disclosure, and opponents of a
disclosure rule commonly argue that the SEC should not get involved in regulating elections. To have a clear-eyed understanding of the consequences of action or inaction by the SEC, lawmakers and the agency itself must recognize
the agency’s current role in shaping private electoral reform. Ultimately, the
case study presented in this Article casts doubt on whether the proposal settlement, in its current form, can be harnessed to advance citizen interests in electoral transparency through corporate policy reform.
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